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THE JURY TRIAL REINVENTED   
 
Abstract 
 The Framers of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States 
Constitution recognized that jury trials were essential institutions for maintaining 
democratic legitimacy and avoiding epistemic crises.  As an institution, the jury 
trial is purpose-built to engage citizens in the process of deliberative, participatory 
democracy with ground rules.  The jury trial provides a carefully constructed setting 
aimed at sorting truth from falsehood.   
 Despite its value, the jury trial has been under assault for decades. 
Concededly, jury trials can sometimes be inefficient, unreliable, unpredictable, and 
impractical.  The Covid-19 pandemic rendered most physical jury trials 
unworkable, but spurred some courts to begin using technology to transcend time 
and place restrictions. These reforms inspire more profound changes.     
 Rather than abolishing or cabining the jury trial, it should be reinvented with 
the benefit of modern science and technology.  Features to be reconsidered include 
having local juries even for national civil cases, using unrepresentative groups of 
only six to twelve jurors, allowing attorneys to arbitrarily exclude jurors during voir 
dire, having synchronous and chronological presentations of cases over days or 
weeks, asking jurors to ignore inadmissible evidence and arguments, and 
facilitating secretive deliberations infected by implicit bias. 
A reinvented, modernized jury institution can better serve its purposes by 
increasing citizen engagement; better fostering civic education and democratic 
deliberation; improving accuracy in sorting truth from falsehood; and enhancing 
efficiency in terms of both time and cost.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2020-2021 coronavirus crisis has shaken American institutions, 
including key hallmarks of the judiciary like the jury trial.   This institutional 
stress has occurred at a time when Americans are suffering from epistemic 
and democratic crises.  The epistemic crisis reflects a modern difficulty in 
sorting fact from falsehood.1  A proliferation of conspiracy theories—
involving everything from vaccine-efficacy, to “QAnon,” to the 2020 
presidential election—reflects the anxiety-provoking uncertainty that many 
Americans feel. At the same time, the democratic crisis reflects a country 
riven by a toxic yet understandable populism, marked by distrust of elites and 
“their” institutions.2  Targets of suspicion include Congress, administrative 
agencies (aka “the swamp” or “the deep state”), and especially state and 
federal courts, which were painted as corrupt or even malevolent after recent 
election controversies.3  A reinvented American jury presents a partial 
 
 
1 See generally, YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK 
PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS (2018). 
2 See Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy — and 
the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (2020) (“[A]uthoritarian populists often attack the ruling 
elite as corrupt and promise to restore power to the people.”) (citation omitted). 
3 See, e.g., Christopher D. Kromphardt & Michael F.  Salamone, “Unpresidented!” or: 
What Happens When the President Attacks the Federal Judiciary on Twitter, J. INFO. TECH. 
& POL. 84 (2020); Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump 
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solution to these epistemic and democratic crises, and the jolt of the 
coronavirus has loosened resistance to change. The necessity of, and 
opportunity to, reform jury trials has rarely been clearer.    
Consider the structure of government absent a well-functioning jury 
institution.  In distributing power horizontally (across the federal 
government’s three branches) and vertically (via the powers reserved to the 
states), the Framers built many buttresses against populist rule.4  The 
Electoral College, for example, was largely designed “to ensure that elites 
directly picked the President.”5  And even the less aristocratic, more 
democratic Framers—for example, those who championed the Seventh 
Amendment—failed to sufficiently anticipate the rise of political parties, 
which would eventually span all branches of government, consolidating 
power and undermining the common good.6  Because the existence of 
factions gives politicians strong incentives to fall in line, Congress can rarely 
 
 
Attacks ‘Obama Judge’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html; 
Darren Samuelsohn & Josh Gerstein, Federal Judge Rebukes Trump Over Roger Stone Jury 
Comments, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/25/judge-
rebukes-trump-roger-stone-jury-117442. 
4 Klarman, supra note 2, at 135 (“The Constitution’s Framers wrestled with a perennial 
problem of representative government: how to prevent democratic majorities from 
redistributing property in their favor.”); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation 
of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006) (“[T]he separation of powers 
would harness political competition into a system of government that would effectively 
organize, check, balance, and diffuse power.”). 
5 Klarman, supra note 2, at 67. 
6 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 4, at 2320. 
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be counted on to use powers like impeachment to check the President. 
Extreme partisanship has even given us reason to question the willingness of 
congressional partisans to reliably count Electoral College votes.      
Nonetheless, the Constitution’s Framers—or at least those who rallied 
for a Bill of Rights—enshrined the right to trial by jury within the Sixth and 
Seventh Amendments. They had two purposes: (a) crafting a civic process 
capable of allowing citizens to conduct deliberative democracy unmediated 
by elites, and (b) creating an institution capable of reliably sorting truth from 
falsehood.7  As William Blackstone noted in 1783, the jury “preserves in the 
hands of the people that share which they ought to have in the administration 
of public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and 
wealthy citizens.”8  With a robust jury, Americans need not rely on a 
corrupted political system to represent their interests; a (largely) random 
sample of everyday people does so directly and temporarily, averting 
problems of corruption and incumbency.9  And in the rarefied setting of the 
 
 
7 See generally SUJA THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 
(2006). 
8 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 683 (Nourse 
Publishing Co. 3d ed., 1959) (1783). 
9 Compare LARRY LESSIG, THEY DON'T REPRESENT US: RECLAIMING OUR DEMOCRACY 
(2019) (describing institutional corruption in politics) with Christopher Robertson, Blinding 
as a Solution to Institutional Corruption 18 (Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Working 
Paper No. 21, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2321353 (“The 
jury ‘represents’ the public from which it is drawn in a statistical sense, rather than via the 
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jury trial (unlike that of, say, social-media), citizens are empowered to 
deliberate at their best. Thanks to the Rules of Evidence, they are shielded 
(albeit imperfectly) from irrelevant, unreliable, and prejudicial information.10 
It is not difficult to see why the procedure by which juries make decisions 
may increase not only their legitimacy and authoritativeness, but also that of 
the entire government.11   
Despite—or perhaps because of—its potential to foster democratic 
deliberation and increase epistemic legitimacy, the jury trial has been under 
assault for decades.12  Juries now resolve fewer than one in twenty cases.13  
As some call for the jury’s abolition and others work to stymie its impact, the 
Sixth and especially the Seventh Amendments face concerted, well-funded 
 
 
political process of electoral representation.”); Michael Shammas, Analysis: Do You Get a 
Jury Trial in Federal Condemnation Cases?, CIV. JURY PROJECT, 
https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/analysis-do-you-get-a-jury-trial-in-federal-
condemnation-cases/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) (“Unlike experts (repeat players), jurors 
need not worry about their reputations, which in turn allows for greater honesty and more 
vigorous disagreement. . . Disagreement heightens the likelihood that a group will come to 
an accurate conclusion.”); Michael H. O’Donnell, Judge Extols Wisdom of Juries, IDAHO ST. 
J. (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/judge-extols-wisdom-of-
juries/article_8dad172c-2521-11e4-8891-001a4bcf887a.html (similar); 2014]. 
10 Robertson, supra note 9, at 19; see also FED. R. EVID. §§ 401, 403.  
11 See generally, DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAMEWORK (2008); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). 
12 See William Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2006) (quoting United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98 n. 
11 (D. Mass., 2002)) (“[T]he American jury system is dying out—more rapidly on the civil 
than on the criminal side … and more rapidly in the federal than in the state courts—but 
dying nonetheless.”). Martin H. Redish, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 70 NW. 
U. L. REV. 486 (1975) (articulating a hostile view). 
13 See Jeffrey Smith & Grant Macqueen, Going, Going, But Not Quite Gone: Trials 
Continue to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does it Matter?, JUDICATURE, Winter 
2017, at 28. 
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opposition.14  On the criminal side, plea bargaining makes trial by jury a 
rarity, generally invoked by only the least rational defendants—those willing 
to reject a much more favorable offer from the prosecutor, who holds almost 
total power over what crimes to charge and what sentences to recommend.15  
On the civil side, advocated “reforms” include sending even more cases to 
arbitration16 or summarily adjudicating them before trial.17  Even after jury 
trials, judges sometimes flip outcomes or impose damage caps that contradict 
the jury’s determinations.18  
 
 
14 See Gene Schaerr & Jed Brinton, Business and Jury Trials: The Framers’ Vision 
Versus Modern Reality, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1056 (2010)  (arguing that “at least ninety 
percent” of the general counsel of Fortune 500 companies “would [if possible] vote to abolish 
the right to jury trial.”); Judson Phillips, Trump Tort Reform Threatens the 7th Amendment, 
WASH. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/2/trump-
tort-reform-threatens-7th-amendment/ (arguing that the tort-reform movement threatens jury 
trials); Letter from Harold Kim, Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to 
Jerrod Nadler, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, and 
Doug Collins, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 
(Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/190910_h.r._1423_fairact_housejudiciary.p
df (advocating against the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act). 
15 Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of 
Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and Hybrid-
Inquisitorialism, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1516-17 (2016). 
16 See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).   But see, Sevier Cty. Sch. 
Fed. Credit Union v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., --F.3d.--, 2021 WL 834010 (6th Cir. 2021) 
(finding an arbitration agreement invalid, only where added by one party as a unilateral 
change in terms).   
17 See Suja Thomas, What Happened to the American Jury? Proposals for Revamping 
Plea Bargaining and Summary Judgment, 43 LITIG. 25, 29-30 (2017); see also Sarah Sachs, 
The Jury is Out: Mandating Pre-Treatment Arbitration Clauses in Patient Intake Contracts, 
J. DISP. RESOL., Spring 2018, at 117; Jean Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory 
Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 17 (2003). 
18 See, e.g., Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d 1071, 1088 (7th Cir. 2019). 
(reducing punitive damages to one-sixth what the jury awarded); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET. AL., 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002). 
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Much dissatisfaction with civil juries stems from corporations who 
fear that juries empower the public to hold businesses accountable.19  But, of 
course, that is their key reason for existing.20   Since the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention were “for the most part, creditor-oriented 
nationalists,” they may have intentionally omitted a civil jury right, which is 
populist and potentially favors debtors.21  “The omission of the civil jury 
triggered a firestorm of protest.”22  To ensure that the judiciary served the 
economic interests of the many, anti-federalists insisted on the inclusion of 
the Seventh Amendment and related provisions in the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
The criminal jury right has a similar populist bent.23  
Some oppose jury trials for good-faith reasons.  Given the small 
number of jurors on any panel, their decisions can be fairly criticized as being 
 
 
19 “[I]t is fair to observe that for decades, business and insurance interests have 
disparaged our civil juries while the courts have failed to defend the single institution upon 
which their moral authority ultimately depends. As a result … bipartisan majorities … have 
restricted access to the … jury severely.” Young, supra note 12, at 76 (citation omitted). See 
also NEIL VIDMAR &VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 341(2007) (finding that juries 
hold corporate actors liable “because of their greater knowledge, resources, and potential for 
impact”). 
20 Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 79, 84 (2003) (“It is generally assumed, and not without reason, that juries are prone 
to favor civil litigants who are members of the community whom they represent.”). 
21 Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated 
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 597 (1992). 
22 Id., at 598. 
23 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968) (“Providing an accused with the 
right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt 
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”) 
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almost as unpredictable as a lottery.24  Some argue that most juries are 
demographically unrepresentative—largely due to ethnic, racial, and class-
based disparities in free-time—frustrating the ideal of judgment by one’s 
peers.25  Relatedly, most Americans view compulsory jury service26 as a huge 
imposition, especially when it conflicts with personal and professional 
obligations.27  Even within the legal profession, overworked lawyers and 
judges often prefer quick and certain pleas or settlements to lengthy and 
uncertain jury trials.28  The coronavirus pandemic only heightened concerns 
about jury trials, which entail convening six to twelve jurors in an enclosed 
courtroom before having them deliberate for hours, days, or even longer.29 
 
 
24 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending 
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1125 (1991-1992) (collecting critiques of juries). 
the jury). See also Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 375 (2011) (“The jury is said to be the least predictable of the decision 
makers in the legal system.”). 
25 See HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE JURY: 
RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1993); Rob Walters, Michael 
Marin & Mark Curriden, Are We Getting a Jury of our Peers?, 68 TEX. B.J. 144, 144-46 
(2005). 
26 See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (the Thirteenth Amendment does not 
bar “enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to the state, such as services in the 
army, militia, or the jury”). 
27 See Andrew J. Bloeser, Carl McCurley & Jeffery J. Mondak, Jury Service as Civic 
Engagement: Determinants of Jury Summons Compliance, 40 AM. POL. RES. 179, 184-85 
(2012); Thomas L. Fowler, Filling the Box: Responding to Jury Duty Avoidance, 23 N.C. 
CENT. L.J. 1, 1 nn. 4-5 (1997-1998). 
28 Christopher Slobogin, The Case for a Federal Criminal Court System (and Sentencing 
Reform), 108 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 942 (2020) (noting that “the number of criminal and 
prisoner cases commenced in federal court has far outpaced increases in judgeships”); Arthur 
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” 
and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 982, 982 (2003); Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal 
Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 183 (2014). 
29 See infra Part I. 
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Thus, juries can be inefficient and unpredictable.  Rather than 
abolishing or cabining them, however, we should reinvent them so that they 
better serve their original purposes of democratic engagement and epistemic 
legitimacy.  
Compare the carriages, bridges, and ships used for war and 
transportation in 1789 with the technologies used for such purposes today.  
The changes are profound. Scientific and technological advances 
revolutionized warfare and transportation; in doing so, they made both 
endeavors more convenient, more efficient, and more effective. Yet, aside 
from admitting a broader franchise of citizens, today’s juries scarcely differ 
from their seventeenth-and-eighteenth-century counterparts.  Given this 
stagnancy, it is not remotely surprising that the jury trial, finalized more than 
two-hundred years ago, is not optimally adapted to the modern world.  The 
ships that Thomas Jefferson ordered in bombarding the Barbary Pirates 
would not be able to fulfill their purpose accurately or efficiently today, 
either.   
Scientific advances, combined with the ease of long-distance 
communication, make one wonder what the jury might resemble if invented 
today. Given the rise of applied statistics and findings from political 
psychology (an emerging subfield of political science), behavioral 
economics, neuroscience, and other fields, would we stick to twelve or fewer 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796292
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jurors?  Would we still force jurors to sit through live, synchronous trials?  
Would we continue hoping that, when exposed to inadmissible evidence, 
merely instructing jurors to ignore that evidence can eliminate prejudice?  
Given the proliferation of inexpensive computers and internet, would we 
even require jurors to physically assemble at a courthouse?  Would we 
conduct a trial of national importance, involving issues like patent 
infringement or products liability, with a jury chosen from just one local 
venire?  In hindsight, the jury trial of 1789 seems quaint at best, and 
counterproductive at worst.  
The familiar features of the jury are not essential; they are historical 
contingencies reflecting eighteenth-century scientific and technological 
realities.30 Real-world innovations implemented during the coronavirus 
pandemic, including the increased use of online hearings and trials, suggest 
that modernizing the jury could yield profound improvements in 
performance, efficiency, and even accuracy. Key goals of both criminal and 
civil procedure might be strengthened, especially those articulated in the first 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure—to promote the “just, speedy, and efficient” 
 
 
30 See e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970) (quoting Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 (1968)) (“[T]he fact that the jury at common law was composed 
of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system 
and wholly without significance.”). 
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resolution of trials31 —and the second Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure—
“to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure 
simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate 
unjustifiable expense and delay.”32 
Ultimately, contemplating the “2021 jury trial” provides a roadmap 
for reforming the jury system so that it better serves its essential functions 
and, ultimately, “We the People.”  This article proceeds in three parts.  The 
first Part discusses the effects of the coronavirus (or Covid-19) pandemic on 
the judiciary throughout 2020 and 2021.  We show that many of this paper’s 
proposed reforms are no longer speculative but were wholly or partly 
implemented in real cases. We also discuss some coronavirus-era caselaw 
with implications for the constitutionality (or lack thereof) of online trials. 
The second Part articulates six fundamental reforms aimed at bringing juries 
into the 21st century.  These include, in order: (1) increasing the number of 
jurors, (2) increasing the use of video presentations, (3) loosening rules 
around trial length and format, (4) divorcing trials from classic time and place 
restrictions, (5) creating nationwide jury pools for national civil cases (and 
 
 
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts . . . [and] should be construed, administered, 
and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”) (emphasis added). 
32 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (“These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just 
determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in 
administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.”).  
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expanding criminal jury pools to the extent permitted by the Vicinage 
Clause), and (6) aggregating votes cast by individual jurors (doing away with 
interpersonal “deliberation” entirely).  The third and final Part briefly reviews 
whether these reforms are likely to be held constitutional before gesturing 
towards several changes to the rules of civil and criminal procedure.  
I. ONLINE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS DURING THE PANDEMIC 
The 2020-2021 Covid-19 pandemic left no institution untouched. 
More than any recent tragedy with the potential exception of the September 
11, 2001 attacks, the pandemic fundamentally altered our political, 
environmental, economic, and legal environments. Thus far, the institutions 
that have survived—and that may even thrive when the pandemic ends—are 
those that took a page from Darwin and adapted.   
In this Part, we begin by briefly describing three 2020 online jury 
trials.  We then review the judiciary’s response to the pandemic, while also 
detailing attempts by state and local governments and academic institutions 
to brainstorm “best practices” for online trials. Third, we detail constitutional 
concerns in the criminal context to argue that—if a pandemic such as Covid-
19 continues longer than one year—online trials may be constitutionally 
necessary if defendants’ speedy-trial rights are to be respected.  Even if online 
criminal jury trials violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause—a 
doubtful proposition—at a certain point, any concerns related to the 
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Confrontation Clause may be overridden by a criminal defendant’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Finally, we describe representative 
protocols and best practices created by state governments and academics, 
which were promulgated after Covid-19 with the aim of enabling fair and 
efficient online jury trials.  
A. Online Jury Trials During the Pandemic  
Although courts have generally hesitated to move jury trials online, 
there are signs that this hesitation began cracking because of the pandemic.   
The nation’s first pandemic-era online civil jury trial was held in a 
Texas state court on May 18, 2020.33  Although the verdict was non-
binding,34  the trial was, nonetheless, notable because of how relatively 
smoothly it went.  Texas blazed another path when, in August 2020, a “virtual 
jury trial … brought about by the pandemic” was conducted by a state 
criminal court in Travis County, Texas.35  Watched by approximately 1,000 
viewers, the case involved “misdemeanor charges alleging excessive speed 
in a construction zone,” and—after using a “private virtual room to review 
 
 
33 See Nate Raymond, Texas Tries a Pandemic First: A Jury Trial by Zoom, REUTERS 
(May 18, 2020, 7:19 AM), https://reut.rs/3hKVqCs. The verdict delivered in that trial was 
non-binding. See id. 
34 Id. (“[T]he abbreviated format and non-binding verdict make it ideal to test the 
viability of holding jury trials remotely, as they grapple with the more daunting challenge of 
how to conduct them safely in person during the pandemic”) 
35 Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Pandemic Potpourri: The Legal Profession’s Rediscovery of 
Teleconferencing, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2020, at 37, 38. 
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the evidence and deliberate,” the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 
speeding charge and not-guilty on the work-zone enhancement.”36  A third 
online jury trial soon followed, this time in a federal court in Seattle, 
Washington, resulting in a verdict of $1.35 million.37  Together, the three jury 
trials—especially the latter two—are likely to be studied before online jury 
trials are “attempted by other courts.”38 
B. Covid-19’s Effect on the Judiciary’s Use of Technology  
 The idea of conducting trials online is not altogether new. With the 
emergence of video-editing technology and convenient video-conferencing 
software, it seems inevitable.  The concept of online trials was discussed in 
law-review articles in 2006 and, briefly, in 1994.39   
 That said, most pre-coronavirus scholarship on how the judiciary can 
incorporate the internet concerns hearings, depositions, and other functions 
 
 
36 See id. “Prosecutors and defense attorneys posted exhibits using the file-sharing 
service Box. The defendant's counsel used a virtual breakout room to confer with their 
client.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
37 Id.  
38 Id.; see also Justin Jouvenal, Justice by Zoom: Frozen Video, a Cat – and Finally a 
Verdict, WASH. POST. (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-
issues/justice-by-zoom-frozen-video-a-cat--and-finally-a-verdict/2020/08/12/3e073c56-
dbd3-11ea-8051-d5f887d73381_story.html. 
39 Nancy S. Marder, Cyberjuries: A New Role as Online Mock Juries, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 
239, 239 (2006) (“[O]nline juries . . . could offer online group decision-making by laypersons 
in cases that do not require a traditional jury trial.”).  See also Bernard H. Chao, Christopher 
T. Robertson, & David V. Vokum, Crowdsourcing & Data Analytics: The New Settlement 
Tools, 102 Judicature 62 (Fall 2018) (arguing for online mock juries as an alternative to 
trials); Henry H. Perritt Jr., Video Depositions, Transcripts and Trials, 43 EMORY L. J. 1071, 
1071-72 (1994) (suggesting the concept). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796292
6-Mar-21] The Jury Trial Reinvented 17 
17 
 
that involve judges and attorneys, but not jurors.  Perhaps the first federal 
plan for safeguarding a functioning judiciary in the event of a pandemic was 
in March 2007, when the Bush administration urged the Department of 
Justice to release “Guidelines for Pandemic Emergency Preparedness 
Planning: A Road Map for Courts.”40  The roadmap, which is far more useful 
logistically than legally, focused on providing guidance to state and local 
courts by crafting “federally supported guidelines” detailing step-by-step 
“best practices” for pandemic-response plans.41  Perhaps its most striking 
feature is its implicit acknowledgment that, in the case of a prolonged 
pandemic, adopting more internet usage might not only be useful but “needed 
[in order] to continue operations.”42  Unfortunately, though the document 
mentioned the necessity of increasing courts’ teleconferencing abilities, and 
despite writing that courts should “review alternative court sites and other 
 
 
40 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, GUIDELINES FOR PANDEMIC EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS PLANNING: A ROAD MAP FOR COURTS (2007), 
https://bja.ojp.gov/library/publications/guidelines-pandemic-emergency-preparedness-
planning-road-map-courts (“[I]t is vital to develop a structured plan for preparing the courts 
to cope with a pandemic outbreak.”).  
41 Id. (“[E]xisting legal authority relating to public health matters should be analyzed to 
ensure there is adequate legal foundation for any court actions. The planning process should 
include the following key components: [(1)] Formation of a planning committee … [(4)] 
Review of constitutional provisions and pertinent authority under state law and [appropriate] 
regulations. . .; [&] (5) Consideration of technological and other capabilities....”) (emphasis 
added).  
42 Id. (emphasis added). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796292
18 The Jury Trial Reinvented [6-Mar-21 
means by which to communicate with . . . participants,” the authors did not 
conduct an in-depth analysis of online jury or bench trials.43  
 The judiciary’s initial response to Covid-19 was, like other 
institutions, to move as much business as possible from the courthouse to the 
internet.  Its next move was to consider how to safely reopen courthouses, 
first for less crowded hearings such as arraignments, and (eventually) for jury 
trials. Although some courthouses were successfully reconfigured in a 
manner complying with CDC’s social-distancing guidelines, some courts 
found that their courthouses simply could not be physically reconfigured in 
manner that would enable safe jury trials.44  Perhaps because, even if it were 
possible to physically reconfigure every courthouse, doing so might be cost-
prohibitive,45 courts increasingly moved several functions online.   
 Courts were far from first in moving to the internet. Schools and 
employers adapted first, moving lessons online and asking non-essential 
 
 
43 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, GUIDELINES FOR PANDEMIC EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS PLANNING: A ROAD MAP FOR COURTS 3, 11 (2007), 
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Publications/Pandemic_Road_Map.pdf. 
Although not comprehensive, the Guidelines did discuss ways to preserve public access to 
courts. Id. at 11 (“Employing technology such as televised court proceedings, public access 
to computerized information systems, and simultaneous court transcription to provide 
participants and the public access to court proceedings may help remedy this issue….”) 
44 See infra, note 62.  
45 Andrew S. Boutros, Jay R. Schleppenbach & Gregory T. Noorigan, The Collision of 
the Speedy Trial Clock with the Coronavirus’s Slowdown Realities: Justice in the Time of 
COVID-19, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2020, at 49, 53 (writing that despite an August 2020 felony 
trial in the Northern District of Illinois, “it remains to be seen whether the intense precautions 
taken there, which applied to every aspect of the jury’s experience from parking to security 
to deliberations, can be replicated on a widespread basis”).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796292
6-Mar-21] The Jury Trial Reinvented 19 
19 
 
employees to work from home. Federal and state legislatures were close 
behind.  In fact, on May 15, 2020, only two months after one journalist 
wondered whether a “virtual Congress is possible,”46 Congress answered in 
the affirmative.47  This was no small change.  Per the New York Times, “the 
coronavirus pandemic officially succeeded in doing what Philadelphia’s 
yellow fever outbreak of 1793, the Spanish influenza of 1918, the Sept. 11, 
2001, attacks and generations of agitators for institutional change never 
could: untethering Congress from its mandate to come together physically.”48  
But if legislators can move online, why not judges?  Similarly, if legislators 
can make law online, and judges can interpret law online, why would jurors 
be less capable of applying law online?    
 With its reliance on arguments from authority and its reverence for 
precedent, the judiciary can sometimes seem particularly traditionalist.49  
This may partly explain why some state judiciaries took surprisingly long to 
 
 
46 Evan Halper & Jennifer Haberkorn, Congress May Move Online as Members Become 
Sick, Quarantined, GOVERNING (Mar. 21, 2020), 
https://www.governing.com/now/Congress-May-Move-Online-as-Members-Become-Sick-
Quarantined.html.  
47 Nicholas Fandos, With Move to Remote Voting, House Alters What It Means for 
Congress to Meet, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/politics/remote-voting-house-coronavirus.html. 
48 Id.  
49 Brad Taylor, Law in the Time of Covid-19: Looking Backward While Moving 
Forward, ILL. B.J., May 2020, at 26 (“The legal profession is, out of necessity, practicality, 
or sometimes sheer stubbornness, notoriously backward looking.”); see also JAMES E. 
MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND RESPONSES TO 
CHANGE 215 (2013) (“In short, the legal profession is ponderous, backward looking, and 
self-preservationist.”). 
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respond to the pandemic.50  For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas did 
not suspend or otherwise substantially alter jury trials until November 20, 
2020.51 This delay occurred even though the governor had announced a state 
of emergency on March 11, 2020,52 only two days before President Trump 
declared a national emergency.53  
Still, to their credit, judges soon joined legislators in recognizing the 
need to move online.  The first online judicial proceedings were generally 
pre-trial hearings and depositions. For example, courts moved quickly to 
allow grand juries to deliberate online, especially after the Southern District 
of New York, citing the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, began allowing 
grand jurors to convene and deliberate via videoconference.54  More 
controversially, another federal judge permitted a juror, during a trial of an 
Iranian banker, to deliberate “by FaceTime because the juror reported feeling 
unwell.  In light of coronavirus, [the judge] stated the court was under 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ and in ‘untested waters.’  After being assured 
 
 
50 See, e.g., COVID-19 Roundup: Court Closures and Procedural Changes, 2020 WL 
1223450 (detailing up-to-date information about court closures and procedural changes, 
including several instances in which courts extended court shut-downs long after first 
anticipated). 
51 In re Response to COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020 WL 6817802, at **1-2 (Ark. 2020).  
52 Id., at *1.  
53 Boutros, et al., supra note 45, at 49. 
54 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require that a grand jury be physically 
together during deliberations. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.  
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the juror would be secluded in an apartment, [the judge] cautioned the juror, 
‘You must think of yourself as present in the jury room.’”55  
 Judges finally received federal guidance in March 31, 2020, when the 
Judicial Conference temporarily “approved … video and teleconferencing for 
certain criminal and civil proceedings.”56 Importantly, “[t]his approval also” 
authorized judges to use “teleconferencing to provide the public and media 
audio access to court proceedings.”57 The Judicial Conference’s action 
followed the March 27, 2020 passage of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (CARES) Act, which temporarily expanded 
videoconferencing and telephone conferencing for certain judicial 
proceedings.58 The passage of the CARES Act prompted states to increase 
their use of videoconferencing in court proceedings.59 Not coincidently, then, 
March 2020 marked a turning-point, after which courts increasingly pondered 
the logistics of holding online trials and hearings during a pandemic.    
 For example, in an order staying jury trials, California’s Chief Justice 
noted that “[c]ourts may conduct such a trial at an [another] date, upon a 
finding of good cause shown or through the use of remote technology….”60  
 
 
55 Richard Gabriel, What Online Jury Trials Could Look Like, LAW360 (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1257185/what-online-jury-trials-could-look-like.  
56 Dixon, supra note 35, at 38. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
60 Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, Order, FIRSTLEGAL (March 23, 2020), 
https://www.firstlegal.com/judicial-council-of-california/. 
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Citing such “good cause,” several cases found that, notwithstanding a party’s 
objections, Covid-19 constitutes “good cause” for remote video 
depositions.61     
Online bench trials followed. In the first such trial, held April 22, 
2020, a Houston, Texas judge oversaw a one-day trial over the Zoom 
videoconferencing platform.62 Despite its relatively boring subject-matter 
(attorneys’ fees), the case garnered substantial interest, with approximately 
2,000 viewers tuning in.63   
Interestingly, in Alabama district court initially bucked the trend of 
delaying jury trials. It denied two pandemic-related motions for a continuance 
and set a trial date of June 1, 2020 in what “was set to be the first federal civil 
[jury] trial in the country after courts closed for the coronavirus pandemic.”64   
The court eventually concluded on its own motion that a continuance to limit 
viral spread was warranted.65  Although Judge Andrew Brasher said he did 
“not take this action lightly,” he concluded that “[t]he public interest requires 
 
 
61 See, e.g., Sonrai Systems, LLC v. Roman, 2020 WL 3960441, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 
2020) (“[H]ealth concerns … create ‘good cause’ for the entry of an order requiring that 
Geotab’s experts’ depositions take place by remote videoconference.”); SAP, LLC v. 
EZCare Clinic, Inc., 2020 WL 1923146, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 31, 2020) (“This court will not 
require parties to appear in person … in the midst of the present pandemic.”).  
62 Daniel Siegal, Texas Court Pioneers Trial by Zoom in Atty Fee Dispute, LAW360 
(Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1265459/texas-court-pioneers-trial-by-
zoom-in-atty-fee-dispute.  
63 Id. 
64 See Quinn v. City of Tuskegee, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1263 (M.D. Ala. 2020). 
65 Id.  
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that this civil trial, like apparently every other [federal] civil [jury] trial in the 
country … be continued.”66  Judge Brasher acknowledged the public interest 
in preventing the spread of coronavirus; yet, crucially, he also acknowledged 
that the public interest means “[j]ury trials cannot remain stalled 
indefinitely.”67   
The criminal justice system was thrown into even more disarray after 
coronavirus than the civil one.  A few ways states altered their usual criminal 
practice during Covid-19 included: (a) Restricting jury trials, usually 
indefinitely; (b) tolling statutes of limitations68; (c) allowing state appellate 
courts (like federal appellate courts) to hear both criminal and civil oral 
arguments via audio or video69; (d) releasing inmates early through parole or 




66 Id. at 1264.  
67 Id. at 1263.  
68 See, e.g., Covid-19 and the Criminal Justice System: A Guide for State Lawmakers, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/covid-19-and-the-criminal-justice-system-a-guide-for-state-
lawmakers.aspx (“Ohio’s legislature enacted a law tolling statutes of limitations for criminal 
offenses, civil actions and administrative actions … set to expire between March 9, 2020 and 
July 30, 2020.”). 
69 Id. “In the beginning of the pandemic, the U.S. Supreme Court postponed oral 
arguments and held oral arguments by telephone, making live audio of the arguments 
available to the public for the first time ever.” Id. In addition, Kansas allowed “the use of 
two-way electronic audio-visual communication in court proceedings.” Id. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. (“At least 17 states and Washington, D.C., suspended all visitation and the 
remaining 33 states suspended normal visitation while allowing visits with attorneys.”). 
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C. Criminal Trials & the Speedy-Trial Guarantee 
Lawyers, academics, and courts have spent substantial brainpower 
thinking through the issues caused by coronavirus’s disruptions to the 
criminal justice system.  “At one extreme, a wide range of constitutional 
rights are implicated at a criminal trial; and for that reason, no online felony 
trial has been conducted. At the other, at least one misdemeanor trial and 
several pre-trial proceedings, as well as appellate and post-conviction 
proceedings, have been conducted virtually.” 72  As with civil trials, criminal 
bench and jury trials alike largely stalled during the pandemic, especially 
“compared with proceedings like first appearances and plea colloquies, which 
consist of the bulk of caseloads.”73  
For criminal cases, the pandemic created a double bind.  On one hand, 
the speedy-trial guarantee presses courts to use video if necessary to clear 
cases, but the Confrontation Clause arguably suggests that only live trials 
would suffice.74  Defense attorneys have begun questioning “how much delay 
is too much for the speedy-trial right, even when dealing with a global 
 
 
72 Deniz Ariturk et. al., Virtual Criminal Courts, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 57-
58. 
73 Id.  
74 See, e.g., Brandon Draper, And Justice for None: How Covid-19 is Crippling the 
Criminal Jury Right, 62 B.C. L. REV. I.-1, I.-3 (2020) (arguing that jury trial by video 
conference would be “inherently unconstitutional” in nature, but that it is necessary to move 
forward to preserve speedy trial rights). 
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pandemic.”75   Concerned about speedy-trial rights, some have even begun 
emphasizing “the need for solutions like videoconferencing to avoid delay, if 
doing so is in their clients’ interests.”76 Unfortunately, the March 2020 
CARES Act accomplished little more than to signal that videoconferencing 
is permitted; it did not say when it is permissible, and it also did not “provide 
instructions, much less guidance, on defendants’ speedy-trial rights.”77  
 A brief overview of the speedy-trial right suggests defense attorneys 
have a point. Since the “Constitution does not specifically define what it 
means for a trial to be ‘speedy,’” speedy-trial timelines were initially 
determined state-by-state.78  But in 1974, Congress passed the Speedy Trial 
Act79 to promote uniformity across jurisdictions. “Interestingly, the Act’s 
proponents did not focus solely on the rights of individual defendants, but 
also on a perceived need to obtain convictions quickly to reduce the risks of 
recidivism.”80 As a result, although the Sixth Amendment’s speedy-trial 
provisions relate to defendant-oriented due-process concerns, the statutory 
framework has a broader focus.  
 
 
75 Id. at 50; John Eric Rapp & Ben Bigham, Covid-19 v. Criminal Defendants, J. KAN. 
B. ASS’N, Nov./Dec. 2020, at 32, 33. 
76 Id. at 54.  
77 Boutros, et. al., supra note 46, at 51.  
78 Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 103-
5(a) (1973). 
79 Speedy Trial Act of 1974 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976). 
80 Boutros, et al., supra note 46, at 50 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508, at 8, 11 (1974)). 
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 That framework establishes concrete time limits to complete federal 
criminal prosecutions. For instance, absent court-approved extensions, the 
period between arrest and indictment usually cannot exceed 30 days, while 
that between arraignment and trial cannot surpass 70.81  If these limits are 
violated, then, absent a recognized exclusion, “the complaint may be 
dismissed with or without prejudice depending upon the seriousness of the 
offense, the facts and circumstances that led to the dismissal, and the impact 
of re-prosecution.”82 
 Federal courts have generally handled delays by invoking the 
“Judicial emergency and implementation” provision of an obscure 1975 
statute.  Under the statute, the chief judge of any judicial district may request 
from the judicial council of her circuit up to a one-year suspension of the 
Speedy Trial Act on grounds that the court is “unable to comply with” it “due 
to the status of its court calendars.”83 What constitutes such a “judicial 
emergency” has never been clearly defined.  Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on the statute to approve Covid-19 continuances imposed by three-
fourths of California’s federal districts.   
 
 
81 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)-(c). 
82 See Boutros, et al., supra note 46, at 50; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)-(2). 
83 18 U.S.C. § 3174(a). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796292
6-Mar-21] The Jury Trial Reinvented 27 
27 
 
 A frequently invoked reason for excluding time under the Speedy 
Trial Act is that doing so furthers the “ends of justice.”84 When conducting 
the Section 3161(h)(7)(A) analysis, a court must explicitly provide its 
justifications before granting a continuance. Statutory factors include: “(1) 
whether the failure to grant a continuance would likely make a continuation 
of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; (2) 
whether the case is so unusual or complex that it is unreasonable to expect 
adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the 
usual time-frame; and (3) whether the failure to grant a continuance would 
deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably 
deny the defendant or the government continuity of counsel, or would 
unreasonably deny counsel the time necessary for effective preparation.”85 A 
continuance is never granted merely “because of general congestion of the 
court’s calendar, lack of diligent preparation or” the government’s “failure to 
obtain available witnesses”86 
 Although courts have,  thus far, treated coronavirus-era “litigation 
continuances—even in criminal cases—as presumptively valid,” the same 
may not “hold true three, six, nine, 12, 18, or 24 months from now.”87  This 
 
 
84 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 
85 See id.  
86 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8). 
87 Boutros, et al., supra note 46, at 54-55.   
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article is being drafted about a month before the March 13, 2020 “coronavirus 
emergency” anniversary, and we expect that more courts will deem “delays 
from Covid-19 … presumptively unreasonable for speedy-trial purposes” 
when those delays “begin … approach[ing] a year.”88  Colorado’s Supreme 
Court has “already recognized that blanket continuances without 
individualized fact-finding offend speedy-trial rules,” and given the passage 
of time it will not be shocking if—an early inclination “to exclude 
coronavirus delays from the speedy-trial clock by citing the interests of 
justice” notwithstanding—other courts mirror or even build on that 
reasoning.89  Thus, though courts certainly will not prohibit all Covid-19-
related delays, they may very well find that the interests of justice are 
outweighed by the speedy-trial right when delays begin exceeding the one-
year mark.90  
 Ultimately, “it remains to be seen just how much delay can be 
tolerated under the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act,”91 or (for 
that matter) under the Eighth Amendment.92  Absent widespread online trials, 
courts may be forced to triage cases in a manner wherein “only the most 
 
 
88 Id. at 53.  
89 Id. at 53-54. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 54.  
92 See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 847 (6th Cir. 2020) (Cole, J. concurring) 
(The Board of Prison’s failure to mitigate coronavirus-spread at the petitioners’ prison … 
“constitutes sufficient evidence for the district court to have found that petitioners were likely 
to succeed on their Eighth Amendment claim.”) 
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serious felony cases involving dangerous defendants who are detained 
pretrial and refuse to waive speedy trial deadlines [are] tried.”93   
 Combined with the speedy-trial right, two other constitutional 
considerations—Fourth and Fifteenth Amendment due-process and the 
Eighth Amendment94—could combine to require online criminal jury trials 
in cases where pandemic-like emergencies begin exceeding a year. Several 
defendants have already argued that holding their physical jury trials during 
the pandemic denied them due process and should have therefore yielded a 
mistrial; the defendants’ arguments failed because the juries were not 
sufficiently anxious or hurried to warrant a mistrial declaration, but the trial 
judges’ diligence in considering such arguments suggests that it is only a 
matter of time before a similar argument succeeds.95  Aside from the “serious 
due-process concerns” that the research—which shows “three out of four 
jurors” were “nervous about attending a trial”—suggests,  the fact “that 
people of color, Democrats, and older Americans [were] very concerned 
about contracting the virus,” 96 raises concerns about juror representativeness 
 
 
93 Melanie Wilson, The Pandemic Juror, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 65, 96 
(2020). 
94 See generally Brandon Garrett and Lee Kovarsky, Viral Injustice (February 22, 2021). 
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3790859. 
95 See, e.g., United States v. Dermen, 452 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1264 (2020) (finding the 
defendant failed to establish a “manifest necessity” requiring the court to declare a mistrial 
because he failed to prove that the jury’s deliberations were less accurate merely because 
they occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic).  
96 Wilson, supra note 93, at 68. 
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because of the risk that these groups will be less likely to participate in trials 
during a pandemic.97    
 Second, it is possible that long delays during pandemics may violate 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel-and-unusual punishment, 
at least when the defendant’s jail has an especially high transmission rate.98 
This consideration would heighten the importance of defendants’ speedy-trial 
rights and, all things considered, would likely outweigh the Confrontation 
Clause concerns that some scholars cite in the context of online trials—at 
least during exigencies like a pandemic.99  
D. Best Practices: Academics & Courts 
Several academic institutions and policymakers crafted protocols for 
online jury trials that were widely cited by courts, scholars, and the media  
In June 2020, for example, NYU Law’s Civil Jury Project enlisted 
dozens of judges, academics, and practitioners in order to craft protocols 
intended for online civil jury trials; it then tested the protocols in a mock jury 
trial.100  The three protocols detailed best practices for online jury selection, 
 
 
97 Id. at 69. 
98 See Brenda Vose, Francis T. Cullen, and Heejin Lee. Targeted release in the COVID-
19 correctional crisis: using the RNR model to save lives, 45 AM. J. CRIM. JUSTICE 769 
(2020) (collecting cases alleging 8th Amendment violations due to the pandemic). 
99 For a more detailed discussion, see Part III.  
100 See, e.g., Virtual Jury Trial Protocols, CIV. JURY PROJECT, 
https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/resources-2/protocols/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
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(b) trial, and (c) deliberation.101 The participants generally concluded that 
online civil jury trials, though challenging, are viable.102  The mock trial is 
available on YouTube.103 
 Around the time, several jurisdictions began proposing their own 
protocols.  The Yolo County Superior Court of California promulgated 
exemplary guidelines for jurors and attorneys aimed at minimizing viral 
spread.104  Effectively, the county determined that only proceedings that 
cannot be constitutionally, practically, or confidentially (e.g., jury 
deliberations) completed via videoconferencing should be conducted inside 
courthouses, and then only with commonsense safeguards like social 
distancing and spaced seating.   
II. BRINGING JURY TRIALS INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 
One lesson of Covid-19 was just how rapidly institutions, including 
the judiciary, can change when forced to do so.  But changes need not be 
 
 
101 Id.  
102 See, e.g., Michael Shammas, The Verdict Is In: Online Jury Trials Are Possible, CIV. 
JURY PROJECT, https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/the-verdict-is-in-online-jury-trials-are-
possible/ (June 1, 2020) (proposing “mixed trials” during the pandemic to preserve 
confidentiality, with some portions held online and other portions held in socially-spaced 
courtrooms). 
103 Civil Jury Project, Highlights from the Civil Jury Project at NYU School of Law and 
CCCPC Virtual Mock Trial, YOUTUBE (July 21, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7U_aVbklGpU&feature=youtu.be. 
104 Id.  
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merely reactive—limited to times of crisis—and a reform like increasing the 
use of video is merely the tip of the iceberg.  
In this Part, we outline six ways to reinvent the jury trial. If adopted, 
we believe our reforms will increase juries’ accuracy, efficiency, and 
democratic legitimacy, thereby furthering the jury’s institutional functions.  
These reforms include empaneling more jurors, increasing the use of video, 
condensing and reorganizing trial presentation, changing the time and place 
where jurors serve, creating a nationwide jury pool for national civil cases 
while expanding the pool in criminal cases, and aggregating juror votes 
individually rather than forcing jurors to deliberate.  In detailing each reform, 
we take care to review potential constitutional and legal barriers.  
A. Larger Juries, Without Peremptory Challenges 
Aristotle is credited with the notion of “the wisdom of the crowd,” 
where many eyes are better than one.105  In recognizing that six or twelve 
minds are better than one, the Founders may very well have had this concept 
in mind while incorporating colonial-era jury provisions into the 
Constitution.106    In 1785, French polymath Marquis de Condorcet published 
 
 
105 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, 1281b (H. Rackham trans., Loeb Classical Library 
1932). 
106 F. Galton, Vox Populi, 75 NATURE 450, 450-51 (1907); see also JAMES SUROWIECKI, 
THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW 
COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004). 
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his famous Jury Theorem, which explained that, if jurors’ rate of error 
regarding any given decision is not more than half, every additional juror will 
increase accuracy.107  
Our understanding of the “wisdom of the crowd” received a boost in 
1906, when Sir Francis Galton—a rather elitist British statistician—
witnessed a contest at a country fair in Massachusetts. The gathering was 
asked to estimate the weight of an oxen for prize money. The animal’s actual 
weight was 1,198 pounds.  Remarkably, the median guess of 1,207 pounds 
was accurate within one percent of the true value, and the average guess was 
1,197 pounds. After replicating the test, Galton was forced to conclude that 
collective estimates are generally more accurate than individual ones. This 
contributed to the groundbreaking insight in cognitive science that a group’s 
individual assessments can be modeled as a probability distribution of 
responses, with the median centered near the true value of the quantity to be 
estimated.  
 Had Galton instead randomly chosen only six to twelve of the group’s 
guesses, the average guess would have been much less likely to represent the 
 
 
107 MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of 
Decision-Making, in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33, 48-49 (Keith Michael Baker, 
ed., 1976). For a useful overview, see William P. Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual 
Bias Through Group Judgment: Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative 
Signals, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 147, 152-54 (2002). 
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true value. Chance, not the laws of statistics, would have determined the 
outcome.  
 As we think about jury trials, this sort of randomness should concern 
us, just as it concerns the parties to such litigation, trying to estimate their 
exposure to liability or their chances of recovering from injuries.108  If we 
thought that lotteries effectively dispensed justice, we could draw a ball from 
a hopper, or—even better—flip a coin, at much less cost than a jury trial.  
Heads, plaintiff wins; tails she loses.   
 Instead, jury trials aim at accuracy, conceived as the discovery of a 
case’s facts followed by the application of the community’s standards to 
those facts.109  In this sense, jury decisions can be evaluated like the 
measurements of instruments used to estimate value, not unlike thermometers 
or bathroom scales.110  Like such instruments’ measurements, jury verdicts 
are infected by two types of potential errors.  
 
 
108 See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in 
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1404 (2000) (“[S]uppose 
that the odds are fifty percent that a given jury will return a verdict for the defendant and 
fifty percent that it will return a verdict for the class; and suppose that if the verdict is for the 
class, the expected damages will be $200 million.... In such a setting, a single class trial is a 
highly risky proposition for both sides.”). 
109 See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 181 
(2010) (“Both the procedure and substance of the American legal system are predicated on 
the assumption that, in any given case, there really is a fact of the matter. The elaborate 
procedures and evidentiary rules are designed ‘to the end that the truth may be ascertained 
and proceedings justly determined.’”)(quoting FED. R. EVID. 102).  See also, Tehan v. United 
States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (describing determination of truth as purpose of trials). 
110 See Michael Saks and Peter Blanck, Justice improved: The unrecognized benefits of 
aggregation and sampling in the trial of mass torts. 44 STANFORD LAW REV. 815, 847 (1992) 
(“Think of the jury as a measuring instrument, like a thermometer or a bathroom scale.”) 
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One source of error involves sampling.111  If all jurors who saw a 
given case would rule the same way, then of course a jury of twelve or six, 
or even one, would be quite sufficient.  Variation is the problem, which 
requires a sufficient sample to solve.  Indeed, the very notion of the jury 
recognizes such heterogeneity; the jury is supposed to capture a “fair cross 
section of the community.”112 Indeed, “as an institution deeply  woven  into  
the  fabric  of  popular governance, the American jury is a central site for 
political representation: the political representation of citizens by citizens.”113 
It is thus important to have the right people in the room. 
 As an example, suppose the actual population of potential jurors in a 
given locality is half male, and suppose, further, that gender is important to a 
civil case in that jurisdiction. With only six to twelve jurors, it would not be 
surprising to wind up with a panel that is entirely male.  
 In the 1940s, the Supreme Court said that it “would be impossible” to 
have a jury that “contain[s] representatives of all the economic, social, 
religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community; 
 
 
111 See generally ROBERT LAWLESS, JENNIFER ROBBENHOLT & THOMAS ULEN, 
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 122 (2016) (discussing sampling bias). 
112 Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 
130 (1940)). 
113 Leib, Ethan J., Michael Serota, and David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Principles and the 
Jury, 1109, 1147 (2014); but see, Fleming v. Chi. Transit Auth., 397 Fed. App’x 249, 249 
(7th Cir., 2010) (“The Supreme Court has not recognized a Constitutional mandate that jury 
pools in civil cases reflect a fair cross-section of the community.”). 
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frequently such complete representation would be impossible.”114 Yet, with 
modern technology, it is not clear that that impossibility remains in 2021.   
The way to get a representative jury is to increase the size of the sample.115   
 The second source of measurement error involves jurors making 
mistakes, whether from bad memory, inattention, incomprehension, 
distraction, or prejudice.116  The risk that a median juror will be voting based 
on one of those problems is greatest, when the jury is smallest. 
For this concern that a juror may be biased and unable to impartially 
resolve the facts of the case, voir dire is the traditional solution.117  By 
questioning jurors, and then excluding some for cause or peremptorily, 
attorneys and judges are supposed to weed out bias.  But research shows that 
prospective jurors are often incapable of accurately assessing their biases or 
reporting them to the court.118  Not even trial attorneys can reliably identify 
jurors who are likely to be adverse.119 Even worse, courts have recognized 
 
 
114 Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220.     
115 See generally Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the 
Effects of Jury Size, 21 L. HUMAN BEHAVIOR 451 (1997). 
116 See Matthew Blackwell et al., A Unified Approach to Measurement Error and 
Missing Data: Overview and Applications, 46 SOC. METHODS & RES. 303, 304 (2015). 
117 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (“Voir dire plays a critical 
function in assuring the . . . right to an impartial jury will be honored.”); see also Pointer v. 
United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1894) (affirming the importance of the opportunity to 
inspect jurors “for the due administration of justice”). 
118 See David V. Yokum, Christopher Robertson & Matt Palmer, The Inability of Jurors 
to Self-Diagnose Bias, 96 DENVER L. REV. 869, 869 (2019). 
119 See DENNIS DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING 46-48 (2012) (describing the 
“pessimistic” findings of empirical research on attorney juror-picking). 
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that voir dire reduces the petit jury’s representativeness.120 Although lawyers 
are not supposed to use race or gender in their peremptory challenges121, they 
need only give a pretextual justification for any particular decision to exclude 
a juror.122 No wonder peremptory challenges are facing increasing 
scrutiny.123  
 The use of peremptory challenges in voir dire is a strange institution 
for the purported goal of representativeness.124  Imagine if this purported 
method of weeding out bias were used in other contexts. Suppose a 
professional polling company such as Gallup has been asked to discern a 
given population’s opinion on mask-wearing.  Could a Gallup worker just 
toss out a certain number of respondents on nothing more than the intuition 
that they might be biased or unrepresentative?  Rather than having lawyers 
use such a hunch to eliminate bias, a more scientific approach is to simply 
recruit a sample large enough to wash out outliers.  Science even provides the 
tools to let us know when our sample is large enough.  
 
 
120 See e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 485 (1990) (“[M]any groups are regularly 
excluded from the petit jury through peremptory challenge.”). 
121 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
122 See Robin Charlow, Tolerating deception and discrimination after Batson. __ 
STANFORD L. REV. 9 (1997); Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial 
Tribulations, 118 COLUMBIA L. REV. 713 (2018). 
123 See generally LaCrisha McAllister, Closing the Loophole: A Critical Analysis of the 
Peremptory Challenge and Why it Should be Abolished, 48 S.U.L. REV. (2021).  
124 See Eugene Tate, Ernest Hawrish, and Stanley Clark, Communication variables in 
jury selection.24 J. COMMUNICATION 130, 131 (1974) (describing the very different 
approaches in Canada in Britain, especially in civil cases). 
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 If these errors involve the minority of jurors, then the larger a jury, 
the smaller the chance that such mistakes will drive the outcome.125 Using 
modern tools of retrospective power analyses and confidence intervals—
scientists can estimate the range of values that cannot be reasonably rejected 
from the alternative hypothesis.126  All of the values that fall within the 
confidence interval are considered consistent with the observed data.  Values 
that fall outside the confidence interval can be rejected.  Larger sample sizes 
yield more precise estimates because each additional observation reduces the 
chance that prior observations were merely due to lucky (or unlucky) draws 
from a background sample.   
 Determining an ideal confidence level turns on our tolerance for 
error.127  If matters little how a case turns out, we might tolerate being right 
just 75% of the time. But if we want our legal system to send accurate 
deterrence signals to primary actors, and if we wish to use the state’s coercive 
power to redistribute resources only when necessary, we might demand a 
much greater degree of accuracy—say, 99%. Scientists routinely use 95% as 
the confidence level, which means they tolerate being wrong in roughly one 
 
 
125 Carmen R. Wilson VanVoorhis & Betsy L. Morgan, Understanding Power and Rules 
of Thumb for Determining Sample Sizes, 3 TUTORIALS QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR 
PSYCHOL. 43, 45-46 (2007); Condorcet supra note 107. 
126 This discussion could alternatively be had in terms of p-values or even Bayesian 
analysis, but confidence intervals help illustrate the dynamics at different sample sizes. 
127 Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1477, 1511 (1999) (“There is no magic to the five-percent criterion.”). 
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of twenty cases. We use that same threshold here, presuming that our legal 
system as a whole should desire at least this level of accuracy when 
collectively affecting millions of lives and trillions of dollars. 
Figure 1 illustrates the application of 95% confidence intervals to a 
binary outcome (i.e., a verdict), with six or 12 jurors in the first columns, as 
in civil courts.  With a hypothetical two-thirds of jurors agreeing that the 
defendant is liable, the confidence interval still overlaps 50%, meaning that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis (i.e., that most jurors would favor the 
other side).  In the given case, at scientific levels of confidence, we cannot 
say that most potential jurors in the population would agree with the actual 
jurors assembled to hear the case.  The outcome may be due to sheer chance. 
The columns in Figure 1 show the possible effects of alternative jury 
sizes.  More than doubling the sample to 25 jurors does not even raise the 

























Figure 1:  95% Confidence Intervals for Various Jury Sizes
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two-thirds will still vote for the plaintiff—our confidence interval increases 
such that we can predict that most others in the community will cast a similar 
vote.  With a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, we can then eliminate 
the possibility that our observed verdict results from chance . 
 Courts could dynamically assign jury sizes to reach greater 
efficiencies. Larger juries are important where the stakes are particularly high 
because the costs of error are higher. It is obviously worse, from a social and 
individual point of view, to erroneously redistribute $250 million than 
$25,000.  For this reason, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires 
larger studies for more dangerous drugs than for less dangerous ones.  
 Larger juries are also especially advantageous in close cases. If only 
55% of jurors ultimately believe the defendant is liable, then a much larger 
jury will be required to reject the null hypothesis than if 99% of jurors believe 
the defendant is liable.  In the latter case, a relatively small jury will be 
sufficient to reject the alternative hypothesis that most jurors in the 
population would instead vote against liability. It is for this reason that social 
scientists often undertake pilot studies to inform the optimal sample size for 
their pivotal study. Such tests can be undertaken for civil trials, or sufficiently 
experienced judges can gauge how close a case may be before assigning an 
appropriately scaled jury.  
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 Unless courts dynamically assign jury sizes, they would need a one-
size-fits-all rule. It seems unlikely that six to twelve jurors are the optimal 
number, especially if we can reduce the costs of summonsing more jurors (as 
our other reforms do). Given what we have seen, 50 jurors might be 
reasonable. However, if we desire sufficient precision on not only the binary 
liability outcomes but also the specific amount of awarded damages, even 
larger juries will be necessary, perhaps numbering in the hundreds or 
thousands. After all, jurors are notorious for their sometimes-wide-ranging 
damage assessments, especially regarding non-economic damages.128  In one 
realistic experiment, for instance, the average juror award for pain and 
suffering was $2.3 million, but the standard deviation was $4.3 million.129  
Statistical mechanisms can be used to aggregate responses and compress 
variability, but larger numbers of jurors are necessary nonetheless in order to 
generate scientifically reasonable damage estimates.130   
 Research suggests that jury service brings incidental benefits to jurors 
and society. Former jurors are more likely to vote and report improved civic 
 
 
128 Valerie F. Reyna et al., The Gist of Juries: Testing a Model of Damage Award 
Decision Making, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 280, 280 (2015). 
129 See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: 
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 315-16 
(1998). 
130 See John Campbell, Bernard H. Chao, Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, 
Countering the Plaintiff’s Ancho: Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 543, 567 (2016). 
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engagement.131   Larger juries would increase these benefits.  Of course, to 
the extent that jury service is burdensome, expanding juries might increases 
this societal burden, but only if none of our other reforms are implemented to 
reduce the burden-per-juror.  
 Considered alone, the prospect of larger juries raises several logistical 
questions. Where would 50 jurors sit? Who would pay the additional costs? 
How could they possibly deliberate? These problems dissolve if some or all 
of our complementary reforms are adopted.  
B. Asynchronous Video Presentation  
 A trial is not unlike a play. The courthouse is the theater, the attorneys 
and witnesses the actors, the judge the director, and the jurors the audience.  
At the time the common-law jury was conceived by the Founders’ British 
predecessors, such live, face-to-face entertainment was the norm. (The 
telegraph was not invented until 1844, the telephone until 1876, and the 
television until 1927, while radios did not see widespread use in the United 
States for entertainment and informational purposes until the 1930s.)  
 Although the raw technologies existed for decades, it was not until 
the advent of online video-streaming in the 2000s, following by its 
 
 
131 John Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the 
Participation Hypothesis, 70 J. POL. 351, 364 (2008); see also Valerie P. Hans et al., 
Deliberative Democracy and the American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 
697 (2014). 
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widespread diffusion in the 2010s, that it became practically and 
economically feasible to record and edit trials for juries to watch and decide 
individual cases.  Now, every attorney has the tools to record high-definition 
video in his or her pocket (i.e., a mobile phone), not to mention the ability to 
edit it on standard computer equipment or, indeed, inexpensive phone 
software. At a slightly higher level of professionalism involving dedicated 
videographers and editors, it is now possible to produce quality video at a 
relatively low cost. Suppose that, instead of staging live trials, courts instead 
created high-quality videos including all the normal aspects of a “real” (i.e., 
live, in-person) trial, including opening arguments, testimonial and 
documentary evidence, closing arguments, and instructions from the judge.   
 Even before the onset of Covid-19, we had several precedents and 
proofs of concept.  In extant civil litigation, it has long been routine to video-
record depositions in all but the smallest civil cases.  When a witness cannot 
attend a live trial, or when a party seeks to use prior testimony to impeach a 
witness, these videos are often edited and played at trial.  These approaches 
are already used for jury research.132  As early as 1994, one scholar argued 
that the notion of the “video trial” was gaining support.133  And—as the first 
section of this paper makes clear—the coronavirus pandemic has caused 
 
 
132 Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, The Effect of Blinded Experts on Juror 
Verdicts, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 765, 765 (2012). 
133 Perrit, supra note 39, at 1071-72. 
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interest in trial by videoconference to skyrocket, with some unwilling 
holdouts eventually concluding that they had no choice but to move trials 
online. Necessity is the mother of invention.  
 There are several potential advantages of video trials.  First, video-
editing allows evidentiary presentation to be more focused and condensed. 
The current debate on whether and how courts should limit trial time evinces 
jurors’ frustrations with the status quo, revealing a perception that modern 
trials largely waste the time of the court and the jurors.134  Indeed, trial 
testimony involves plenty of proverbial throat-clearing, parrying, dodging, 
and repeating.  The use of video depositions in trials today shows how they 
can be condensed from raw material consuming seven hours or more to just 
an hour or so, including only the key testimony that each party designates as 
best representing its case.135  This distillation obviously offers increased 
efficiency. It may also improve accuracy by improving juror attention and 
comprehension. Eliminating extraneous testimony lessens the risk that jurors 
 
 
134 See Stephen D. Susman & Richard L. Jolly, An Empirical Study on Jury Trial 
Innovations, CIV. JURY PROJECT, Feb. 2017, at 101, 103, 
https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/sds-rlj_Empircal-Study-
on-Trial-Innovations.pdf (arguing for time limits on trials).   
135 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1) (specifying time length of depositions); Estate of Spear 
v. Comm’r, 41 F.3d 103, 116 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Although live testimony is generally preferable 
to videotaped testimony, the absence of such testimony, even from a key witness, is only 
minimally prejudicial when that witness is adverse and when there is a videotaped deposition 
that can be introduced in lieu of live testimony.”). 
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will get bored, confused, or distracted. (This is not to demean jurors, but to 
acknowledge standard human limitations.) 
 Second, an edited video trial also allows the court to resolve 
objections to improper evidence or arguments in advance.  In major cases, 
judges often use pre-trial Daubert hearings to similarly proscribe what 
experts may and may not say.136  For many other issues, however, parties 
must object during trial, once a purportedly objectionable piece of evidence 
is offered, often in front of the jury but ideally at sidebar.  This process wastes 
more jury time and risks contaminating the jury by exposing it to improper 
evidence.  In contrast, in video trials objections can be resolved in advance 
and, if sustained, the improper material can simply be edited out. These 
procedures are already used for parties to designate and register objections to 
video depositions in standard trials. The technique could be expanded to 
cover a complete video trial.  
 The primary advantage of these approaches is to vindicate and 
reinforce the Rules of Evidence; with a properly edited video, we can 
virtually eliminate the risk that the jury will be exposed to inappropriate 
material that might cause it to make an erroneous decision. Decades of social-
science research suggest that it is ineffective or even counterproductive to tell 
 
 
136 See e.g., Carlson v. Bioremedi Therapeutic Sys., Inc., 822 F.3d 194, 201 (5th Cir. 
2016) (reversing where “the district court disregarded its gatekeeping function to determine 
the admissibility of evidence outside of the presence of the jury”). 
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jurors to try to ignore material they have erroneously seen.137 This ineffective 
technique could be rendered obsolete with video-editing. Even “live” online 
trials could include a five or so second delay—not unlike delays used today 
in live television broadcasting—to enable court staff to omit objections. 
 Third, a video trial would also allow jurors to simply rewind the video 
to refresh their memories when deciding cases. During deliberations, courts 
now sometimes provide trial transcripts or excerpts thereof, but these lack 
key markers of witness credibility (e.g., physical demeanor), which is a 
primary characteristic for jurors to consider.138  Indeed, courts regularly 
discourage juries from over-relying on transcripts: “The transcript is not 
authoritative. If you remember something different from what appears in the 
transcripts, your collective recollection is controlling.”139  A huge body of 
research suggests that human memory is far from perfect, and arguably now 
obsolete when other technologies, such as video recording, are available.140 
(Imagine an eyewitness purporting to deny a fact that is clearly recorded on 
security video; the reliance on memory is superfluous.)  
 
 
137 See Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to 
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 477 (2006). 
138 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 198 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“No such 
determination of credibility is possible when the witness comes before the trial factfinder by 
the reading of a cold transcript.”); see also Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 
35 (1944). 
139 United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1998). 
140 See generally, Daniel L. Schacter & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory and law: what can 
cognitive neuroscience contribute? 16 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 119 (2013). 
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 Fourth, video-taped materials can be reused within the judicial 
system. Appellate courts often complain that they cannot evaluate aspects of 
a witness’s demeanor at trial, and this is a primary basis that trial courts are 
“given much deference.”141 Rather than poring through such “cold” 
transcripts142, courts of appeal can simply watch the videos, seeing exactly 
the same thing that the trial judge saw.   
There may nonetheless be other reasons for deference to lower courts, 
but reversals will nonetheless sometimes be necessary.  Video trials can 
dramatically reduce the costs of remanding to correct an error.  For example, 
suppose that an appellate court determines that the trial judge erred by 
excluding certain testimony.  The testimony can simply be reinserted, and the 
case played out before another set of jurors, rather than remanding the case 
and having the court conduct another jury trial, which might cost an 
additional year of time and millions of dollars.143  Saving time would be 
 
 
141 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 479, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1209, 170 L. Ed. 2d 175 
(2008). 
142 See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343, 126 S. Ct. 969, 977, 163 L. Ed. 2d 824 
(2006)(“Appellate judges cannot on the basis of a cold record easily second-guess a trial 
judge's decision.”); United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 17 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Only 
rarely-and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances-will we, from the vista of a cold 
appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative 
weighing of probative value and unfair effect.”)(quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 
F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir.1988)). 
143 For a similar approach, see D. Alex Winkelman, David V. Yokum, Lisette C. Cole, 
Shelby C. Thompson, & Christopher T. Robertson, An Empirical Method for Harmless 
Error, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1405 (2014) (testing variations on the same trial to determine 
whether an error was harmless). 
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especially advantageous in criminal cases involving questions of wrongful 
imprisonment.   
 Or suppose that the case is part of a mass tort, involving hundreds or 
thousands of similarly situated plaintiffs.  Notwithstanding the common 
issues (e.g., defendant conduct) each plaintiff may need to prove specific 
facts (e.g., whether they relied on the misrepresentation, or whether the 
chemical caused their specific injury).   Accordingly, the main body of the 
case can be optimized in the video trial for reuse in every subsequent 
plaintiff’s case, with a different module inserted for each plaintiff, involving 
the evidence specific to that plaintiff. This procedure would be much more 
efficient than conducting a live trial for each plaintiff. 
 One limitation of asynchronous video trials is that jurors will be 
unable to inject their own questions into the trial, an important innovation of 
trial practice.144  The court, or litigants themselves, may instead generate and 
resolve such questions from mock jurors before finalizing the trial video, 
thereby ensuring the most common questions get answered.  This limitation 
would not, of course, apply in live, online trials where video is merely offered 
to jurors after trial and during deliberation.  Indeed, in live trials, jurors’ 
abilities to submit questions will likely be enhanced, because they will be 
 
 
144 See Susman & Jolly, supra note 134, at 110-11. 
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able to non-intrusively type and submit their questions while watching the 
trial in a private manner that might cause them to hesitate less than they would 
in an in-person trial. Submitting questions to a court technician via the 
internet may be less intimidating for jurors as well.145  
 Another potential limitation involves the risk of improper editing such 
that the videos the jurors see are not actually fair or representative of the 
evidence. This concern has already been surmounted in the use of video 
depositions at trial.  The trial judge will review the video before allowing 
both parties to preview the materials to (a) submit objections to material that 
should properly be excluded (for example, their objections during the actual 
trial) or (b) ensure that portions of the trial were not improperly removed that 
could materially impact the case’s outcome. Of course, such decisions will 
be subject to appellate review. 
 A final group of concerns are psychological.  We have already 
mentioned one consideration: That unwatched jurors are less responsible 
jurors. There are several other considerations to consider.   
 First, video may be less engaging than live trials.  The literature on 
online education is instructive, as educators have worked for decades to move 
classes from brick-and-mortar settings online. One recent review of the 
 
 
145 See Michael Shammas, Thoughts on Optimizing Time & Attention in Virtual Trials, 
CIV. JURY PROJECT (July 9, 2020), https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/the-trial-of-counting-
trials-2/.  
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literature concludes that “[t]aken as a whole, there is robust evidence to 
suggest online learning is generally at least as effective as the traditional 
format.”146  Thus, for the cognitive purpose of imparting understanding, it 
seems video is not an impediment.147  The last year has provided further 
evidence that online teaching environments are effective, and that best 
practices that teachers use are sometimes transferable to judicial settings—
especially for in presenting crucial yet sometimes-tedious monologues like 
jury instructions.  
Educators have found that “spaced” learning is ideal.148  Courts could 
release segments of trial videos in a pre-planned, timed manner to optimize 
focus and attention.  Some research suggests that the  ideal attention span is 
about twenty-five minutes, with five-minute breaks interspersed throughout 
to give the brain time to consolidate information.149  Even if courts are 
 
 
146 Tuan Nguyen, The Effectiveness of Online Learning: Beyond No Significant 
Difference and Future Horizons, 11 MERLOT J. ONLINE LEARNING & TEACHING 309, 309 
(2015). 
147 Another common-sense safeguard when crucial monologues like jury instructions are 
delivered virtually—aside from making them especially concise and clear—involves making 
trial video available so that daydreaming jurors can fill in gaps in their knowledge. It may 
also be advisable to send each juror a transcript of monologues such as jury instructions.  
148 Praveen Shrestha, Ebbinghaus Forgetting Curve, PSYCHESTUDY (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.psychestudy.com/cognitive/memory/ebbinghaus-forgetting-curve 
(“Ebbinghaus forgetting curve describes the decrease in ability of the brain to retain memory 
over time.”).  
149 See ADAM GAZZALEY & LARRY D. ROSEN, THE DISTRACTED MIND: ANCIENT 
BRAINS IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD (2016); Loren Dunn, “The Pomodoro-Technique and 3 
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unlikely to make live online sessions that short, judges should consider using 
frequent breaks in order to avoid “Zoom fatigue” during synchronous 
hearings and trials.150     
 Second, video testimony may be less emotionally arousing than 
physical testimony. Whether live or asynchronous, it may therefore lack the 
affective impact of in-person trials. (Picture jurors sitting feet away from a 
sobbing plaintiff.)  Summarizing the literature, Susan Bandes and Jessica 
Salerno write that “there is some evidence that videotaped testimony evokes 
less empathy than in-court testimony, though video also presents 
opportunities for close-ups and other artistry that might ameliorate the effect 
of the decision maker’s lack of proximity to the witness.”151   
 Still, videos can be quite emotionally arousing.  After all, this is the 
rationale judges use today to exclude certain video presentations (for 
example, victim impact statements and day-in-the-life videos) that may be 
too emotionally arousing.152  Even if video does mute emotional arousal, it is 
 
 
more-research-backed-study-tips/?sh=6257eeb85027; Alan Henry, Productivity 101: A 
Primer to the Pomodoro Technique, LIFEHACKER (Jul. 12, 2019), 
https://lifehacker.com/productivity-101-a-primer-to-the-pomodoro-technique-1598992730.  
150 Liz Fosslien & Mollie West Duffy, How to Combat Zoom Fatigue, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Apr. 29, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-to-combat-zoom-fatigue. 
151 Susan Bandes & Jessica Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The Cognitive 
Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1040 
(2014). 
152 Id. at 1040-41. 
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unclear this counts as a disadvantage.153 The Supreme Court has said that 
“[t]he jury system is premised on the idea that rationality and careful regard 
for the court’s instructions will confine and exclude jurors’ raw emotions.”154  
Indeed, as Rule of Evidence 403’s distinction between the probative and the 
prejudicial reflects, emotion is a hallmark of unfair prejudice.155  Video, 
especially carefully edited video, may facilitate an appropriate degree of 
dispassionate consideration of the evidence.    
C. Shorter, Edited Trial Presentations  
 The 2019 Academy Award winner for best picture, Green Book, is 
130-minutes. The 2018 winner, The Shape of Water, is 123-minutes. The 
2017 winner, Moonlight, is nine minutes short of two hours. The success of 
these award-winning films suggests that a rich and comprehensive story can 
be told in a matter of hours. 
 We have suggested that one benefit of asynchronous video trials is 
that, by eliminating extraneous material, they facilitate somewhat shorter 
trials than live video trials, which themselves facilitates shorter trials than 
physical trials due to savings in travel time. This benefit might yield trials 
 
 
153 See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (David Klein & 
Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010). 
154 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, 556 U.S. 838, 841 (2009). 
155 Bandes & Salerno, supra note 151, at 1006 (quoting Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, 
Truth and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 314 n.181 (2012) and Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. 
REV. 497, 503 (1983)). 
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that are on average twenty or even forty-percent shorter than current trials. 
But it is worth considering whether the length and format of trials should be 
more profoundly changed by making substantive changes to typical trial 
procedure, potentially yielding something closer to a 90% reduction in time.   
 Currently, trials—criminal and civil—consist of each side giving an 
opening statement before calling witnesses, displaying documentary and 
physical evidence, and ultimately delivering a closing argument (often 
repetitive and tied to jury instructions that have already been specified by the 
presiding judge).  All of this is followed by the judge’s then actually 
delivering those jury instructions. Under this time-honored format, key 
evidence is typically shared three times (through openings, testimonial and 
documentary evidence, and closings), and jury instructions are given at least 
twice (by both attorneys and the judge). Instead, what if an entire two-week 
trial were condensed into, say, a 130-minute video, including evidentiary 
highlights from each side (e.g., video clips of testimony), and incorporating 
succinct yet clear jury instructions?  
 Litigators already give condensed closing arguments that integrate the 
court’s legal instructions and highlight key evidence, often in an hour or less. 
(Even in this compressed setting, jurors often complain about lawyerly 
rambling and repetition.) Whether juror accuracy is enhanced by watching 
the entire trial in addition to the closing arguments—which already concisely 
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tie the relevant evidence and the proper legal standard—is an open empirical 
question. Closing arguments alone may be sufficient. 
 Scholars have long advocated (and courts have recently experimented 
with) instructing jurors as to the elements of the legal cause of action earlier, 
long before trial ends.156 This reform would help jurors make legal sense of 
the factual evidence they hear. Courts are also experimenting with letting 
litigants introduce witnesses in order to explain their testimony’s relevance 
to the case.  A closing argument inherently accomplishes both functions.  
 Research on decision-making suggests that people almost never 
withhold judgment until after they have carefully considered the relevant 
information.157  They instead make an early assessment and, with the receipt 
of additional information, tend to selectively assimilate that information to 
accord with their initial judgment. This process makes it unlikely that adding 
a 131st minute, a 141st minute, or even hundreds more minutes could change 
the average juror’s decision. Each additional minute yields diminishing 
marginal utility. At some point, more minutes—even ones featuring 
 
 
156 See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing jury instructions into the twenty-first century. 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445 (2005): 449; Neil P. Cohen, The timing of jury instructions. 67 
TENN. L. REV. 681 (1999). 
157 See Reid Hastie, The role of stories in civil jury judgments 32 U. MICH. JL REFORM 
227 (1998): 227; Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental research on jury decision-making, 244 
SCIENCE 1046 (1989). 
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completely novel, useful information—may exert negative effects, especially 
if they promote fatigue, distraction, boredom, or irritability.  
 Of course, complex cases will continue to require longer trials.158  
Common-sense suggests that trials featuring complex scientific or 
technological issues will usually be longer than average, as jurors may 
initially lack an understanding of the underlying patents or technology, and—
therefore—of what facts are legally material.  Videos created for such 
complex cases may optimally feature running times more akin to an epic—
Gandhi (191 minutes) or Gone with the Wind (about 226 minutes)—than an 
action film. Nonetheless, our experience advising parties to complex cases or 
observing oral advocacy at the appellate and trial levels suggests that most 
litigants can make a coherent case within one hour.   
 Aside from efficiency and accuracy, due-process issues might also 
present challenges, especially where litigants wish to tell their own stories (as 
opposed to having them be excerpted in their attorney’s closing argument).159  
Such due-process considerations could arise, for example, in employment-
discrimination cases, public-employment cases, and cases where a key issue 
 
 
158 Nora Engstrom, The Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2134 (2018) 
(reviewing evidence that trials have become shorter in recent years, although a few protracted 
trials are still conducted every year). 
159 Compare John E. Rumel, The Hourglass and Due Process: The Propriety of the Time 
Limits on Civil Trials, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 238 (1992) and Nora Freeman Engstrom, The 
Trouble with Trial Time Limits, 106 GEO. L.J. 933, 933 (2018) (arguing against time limits 
on trials). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796292
56 The Jury Trial Reinvented [6-Mar-21 
involves whether the plaintiff has a property interest in a government position 
or benefit that she was deprived of without adequate process.  Nonetheless 
courts have for decades had and used the power to place reasonable limits on 
trial time.160  The question is not whether to limit the video trial time, but 
rather what is the minimum necessary to do justice, for a given case? 
 One potential barrier is pragmatic: Lawyers may hesitate to readily 
embrace a reform that (on first glance) might reduce their billable hours. Do 
not worry, lawyers; you will still have plenty of work when preparing the 
condensed video presentation. Indeed, this new format may require even 
more legal acumen, forcing attorneys—like the director of a film—to tell 
complicated stories in an engaging, concise, and accurate manner. Besides, 
our legal system is not designed to please lawyers; it is supposed to achieve 
reasonably accurate outcomes with reasonable efficiency, while—ideally—
providing a sense of due process. 
D. Breaking Limitations Time and Place 
 If the foregoing reforms are implemented such that radically 
shortened trials are conducted by video, the geography of trials can be 
rethought.  In contrast, when staging live trials, the lawyers, judge, witnesses, 
jurors, and court staff are forced to be in the exact same place at the exact 
 
 
160 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(O) 
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same time.  Witnesses must travel from the opposite side of the world or may 
not even be subpoenaed to appear at all.161  In major cases, each side may 
bring dozens of personnel (including lawyers, presentation consultants, 
paralegals, and other support staff) to a trial site in a remote federal 
courthouse (e.g., the Eastern District of Texas), living there for a month or 
longer.  The practical difficulty of aligning all those schedules against 
professional and personal obligations, as well as exigent circumstances like 
health or weather emergencies, often causes trials to be cancelled or 
rescheduled for a later date (i.e., “continued”). 
 Video potentially enhances efficiency—in terms of both travel costs 
and opportunity costs—reducing the delay that accompanies continuances. 
The attorneys, witnesses, and judge may perform their functions at various 
convenient times and places (for them), while the jurors can perform their 
functions at another relatively convenient time and place (their local 
courthouse, or perhaps elsewhere, as discussed).   
 Physically convening jurors entails substantial temporal and 
monetary costs.  By contrast, if jurors serve from home, such costs disappear.  
Judges can utilize this increased efficiency to save even more time, lowering 
the typical day’s trial or hearing time to (say) four hours or less.  Aside from 
 
 
161 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A)-(B) (allowing witnesses to be subpoenaed if nearby). 
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optimizing attention, this change could secure a more representative jury, 
something that complements our other reforms.  If jurors know that the court 
day has been shortened, a larger and more diverse cross-section of the 
community may be willing and able to serve.  
 Jurors will often prefer to serve at home or the office.  It is less 
expensive in direct costs (e.g., a bus fare), indirect costs (e.g., childcare), and 
opportunity costs (e.g., lost wages) than traveling to a courthouse. And they 
would prefer to schedule their service at a convenient time. Perhaps after 
dinner or during a slow morning at work? 
 Currently, thousands of potential jurors are excused for hardship, 
sometimes only after suffering the hardship of having to appear at court to 
plead with the judge.162  Many others serve despite some level of hardship 
that is nonetheless insufficient to warrant excusal.163 
 Not long ago, Americans were required to head downtown for all 
manner of routine tasks, from exercising the franchise to renewing a license. 
Such tasks are increasingly completed remotely. Most states offer online 
 
 
162 See generally Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The 
Impairment of the Fair Cross-Section of the Community, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155 (1995); see 
also H. Fukarai & E.W. Butler, Organization, labor force, and jury representation: economic 
excuses and jury participation, JURIMETRICS J., 32, 49 (1991).    
163 Thiel, 328 U.S. at 223-24 (1946) (holding that “[a] juror shall not be excused by a 
court for slight or trivial causes, or for hardship, or for inconvenience to said juror's business, 
but only when material injury or destruction to said juror's property or of property entrusted 
to said juror is threatened.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. id. (“[A] 
federal judge would be justified in excusing a daily wage earner for whom jury service would 
entail an undue financial hardship.”)  
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vehicle registration that are making trips to the DMV a thing of the past. 
Three states now conduct elections solely by mail; 39 permit qualified voters 
to cast mail-in ballots.164   
 Though slow to adopt new technologies, in 2020, Covid-19 caused 
several courts to begin moving functions typically accomplished by mail 
online.  For example, the Yolo County Superior Court permitted “potential 
jurors to respond to summons by Zoom or phone,” while also promulgating 
“easy step-by-step instructions” featuring “hyperlinked—quite large—
buttons” for jurors to click in order to submit their reply to summons.165  
Courts that move to online trials or hearings might also benefit, from 
“creating a technological ‘Jury Service Staff’ available to answer questions 
by phone or email.”166  
 With the high-speed internet, customized video can now be reliably 
delivered at little cost. Citizens can watch via a variety of devices including 
laptops, tablets, smartphones, and smart-home devices.  A basic 7” tablet with 
video-streaming capabilities can be purchased for $40—less than one day of 
 
 
164 Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail, and Other Voting at Home 
Options, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Sept. 24, 2020), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx.  
165 Shammas, supra note 101.  
166 Id. 
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minimum-wage work. Nearly 60% of Americans now pay for video-
streaming streaming services like Netflix.167  
 A digital divide nonetheless persists. Poor and rural Americans 
disproportionately lack access to high-speed internet and network-ready 
devices.168 These problems are not insurmountable; for example, such 
citizens might travel to their nearest public library or courthouse. 
Alternatively, there may be ways to mail them loaner devices with cellular 
data capabilities.  
 When jurors serve from home, it may be difficult to monitor whether 
jurors are having ex parte conversations or consulting extraneous materials 
in online trials. On the other hand, using larger sample sizes in concert with 
shorter trials may make other sorts of misconduct more difficult. For instance, 
our reforms make it largely infeasible for litigants to find—much less actually 
contact—jurors, whose service may be limited to an hour or two. Similarly, 
serving from home or the office creates a risk that jurors will be interrupted. 
Of course, for short interruptions, they can simply pause the video and resume 
 
 
167 Steve Liesman, Nearly 60% of Americans Are Streaming and Most with Netflix: 
CNBC Survey, CNBC, Mar. 29, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/29/nearly-60-percent-
of-americans-are-streaming-and-most-with-netflix-cnbc-survey.html. 
168 A. Scheerder, et. al, Determinants of Internet skills, uses and outcomes. A systematic 
review of the second and third-level digital divide.  8 TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 34, pp. 
1607-624 (2017).  
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when ready.  Although interruptions are usually bad, due to spaced-learning, 
intentional interruptions could benefit overall accuracy.169   
 A more general concern relates to the seriousness and solemnity of 
the trial.170  Unless jurors are required to be physically present in a courthouse 
to view video or other digital evidence, they could feel a lack of gravity and 
tension that might conceivably translate not only to poorer attention, but also 
poorer accuracy, contradicting our reforms’ intended purposes of improving 
the jury’s essential functions, including accuracy. But does science suggest 
that reduced tension makes minds wander?  Not exactly.  Although many 
might assume that stress lowers performance, this is true only to a degree.  
Per the so-called Yerkes-Dodson law, performance generally “increases with 
physiological or mental arousal (stress) but only up to a point. When . . . stress 
becomes too high, performance decreases.”171  
 This finding suggests that, if judges are unwilling to artificially 
shorten jury instructions during live online trials,172 they must take extra care 
to impart—in jargon-free language—the gravity of the situation facing jurors: 
 
 
169 Shrestha, supra note 169.  
170 Marder, supra note 38. At 264-65 (2006) (“The architecture of the courtroom, with 
actors in their designated places, the formality of the procedures, and the presence of the 
parties who will be affected by the jury’s verdict, remind jurors of the seriousness of their 
task. An online mock juror lacks such a setting.”). 
171 Francesca Gino, Are You Too Stressed to Be Productive? Or Not Stressed Enough?, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 4, 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/04/are-you-too-stressed-to-be-
productive-or-not-stressed-enough. 
172 See Shammas, supra note 145. 
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To ensure justice is done.  It also heightens the attention-based rationales for 
video-editing.   
  One way to minimize distractions even during asynchronous online 
trials would be for courts to ship jurors low-cost tablets, which prevent other 
tasks from being performed concurrently on the device and monitoring 
juror’s presence and attention.173  Going further, we expect that virtual-reality 
goggles will be the next frontier.174  Already, the devices can detect when 
users remove their devices, and the virtuality-reality experience is 
substantially more engaging than video.  Using a virtual-reality headset also 
eliminates (nearly completely) concerns that jurors might engage in 
distracting behavior during trial and deliberation, while lessening the risk of 
a juror impermissibly recording the trial. (This is because (1) unlike with a 
traditional screen, it is nearly impossible to use a phone or portable camera 
to record what is playing on a virtual-reality headset; and (2) courts could 
 
 
173 See Stephanie Francis Ward, Amid Claims that the Online Bar Exam Went Well, Some 
Test-Takers Have a Different View, ABA J., Oct. 20, 2020, 
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/amid-claims-that-online-bar-exam-went-well-
some-test-takers-have-a-different-view. 
174 See Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Jury Glasses: Wearable 
Technology and Its Role in Crowdsourcing Justice, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 115, 
118 (2015) (arguing for reforms that “could reduce judicial backlogs, temper . . . attempts to 
avoid participation in dispute resolution, promote legal cognizance, and improve community 
participation, in addition to reducing the prevalence of personal bias in decision-making”). 
Natalie Salmanowitz, Unconventional methods for a traditional setting: The use of virtual 
reality to reduce implicit racial bias in the courtroom." 15 UNHL REV. 117 (2016). 
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prophylactically disable the recording functions on the virtual-reality 
devices.) 
 Our time-and-place reform can also be applied dynamically, in the 
much like jury sequestration is currently applied on a case-by-case basis. For 
most routine cases, and certainly for public proceedings, it may be harmless 
and efficient for jurors to serve at locations of their choosing.  In the wake of 
Covid-19, Yolo County took care to include in its guidelines “that every 
hearing or proceeding that can be done virtually is done virtually, including 
jury orientation and hardship hearings.”175  
 There is likely no plausible argument that allowing jurors to serve at 
a time and place of their choosing will enhance the jury’s chief functions: 
accuracy and democratic norm-setting. Except for exigencies—say, a 
pandemic—where the anxiety of proximity could distract or rush jurors,176 
this reform has value mostly in terms of efficiency. It is therefore our least 
important reform.   
E. A National Jury Pool for National Civil Cases 
 The foregoing section suggests breaking the geographic link of jurors 
and the courthouse, taking advantage of online technologies, and thereby 
 
 
175 Shammas, supra note 111.  
176 Wilson, supra note 93, at 68 (noting that juries deliberating during coronavirus may 
have felt rushed and been less representative due to differential levels of concern about 
Covid-19 felt by different ethnicities and partisans).  
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allowing jurors to serve from their local courthouse, public library, office, or 
even bedroom.  Not only might this increase convenience, but it could also 
allow greater jury representativeness by enabling national jury pools in cases 
of national importance, such as patent infringement or products liability 
cases.177  When the alleged wrongdoing and harms are national, why should 
a jury be local?  
 In cases where a defendant is a national or multinational 
corporation—e.g., Amtrak—a jury located in the Northeast may very well 
have biases different from ones located elsewhere, not only for demographic 
but also for pragmatic or utilitarian reasons related to the nature of the case.178  
(For example, jurors in some regions likely have more experience as train 
passengers than jurors in other regions.)  Aside from increasing accuracy by 
ensuring knowledgeable jurors are included, allowing jurors throughout the 
country to participate in trials involving corporate defendants like Amtrak has 
 
 
177 See Laura G. Dooley, National Juries for National Cases: Preserving Citizen 
Participation in Large-Scale Litigation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 411, 411 (2008) (advocating for 
national pools to “eliminate incentives for parties to forum-shop [that] would make the 
decisionmaking body representative of the population that will feel the effects of its 
decision”); see also Luke McCloud and David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law 
Problem of Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law. 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
374 (2010) (suggesting a similar solution for choice of law); Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3737728. 
178 Compare Wilmotte v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2020 WL 106744, at *1 (W.D. 
Wash., Jan. 9, 2020) (in which the jury awarded $17 million in damages against Amtrak) 
with Vanderburgh v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2007 WL 549740, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 16, 
2007) (involving a jury’s rejection of claims that Amtrak was reckless). 
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the additional benefit of ensuring that the second function of juries—
democratic norm-setting—functions as intended.  After all, a norm 
appropriate in, say, North Dakota may be inappropriate in New York.    
 Scholars, courts, and litigants have express concern that “sympathetic 
local jury pools” are unrepresentative, and the incentives creating incentives 
for litigants to “forum shop” for favorable jurisdictions.179 Major companies 
have even sought to exploit their repeat-player status by ingratiating 
themselves with the local jury pool through funding extravagant charitable 
works such as ice-skating rinks.180 
 In other cases, the problem is flipped:  A local jury is hostile 
to a litigant.181  Take the case of Jeffrey Skilling, former CEO of Enron, a 
Houston company that collapsed after a spectacular case of securities fraud.  
As it collapsed, many Houstonians lost their entire life savings in their 
company retirement accounts, and many potential jurors reported personally 
knowing people injured by Enron’s alleged fraud.  Some argued that when 
 
 
179 Alisha Key Taylor, What Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas 
Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.  570, 583 (2007).  See also 
Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws Patent Cases 
– Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 301-02 (“One of the oft-cited 
reasons for the District's popularity, as well as its undeserved reputation, has been the 
allegedly ‘plaintiff-friendly juries’ who are ‘predisposed to find for plaintiffs and award large 
damages.’”) 
180 See Anthony Zurcher, Why a small town in Texas had Samsung's ear, BBC, May 27, 
2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40021491. 
181 See Victor E. Schwartz, Sherman Joyce, and Cary Silverman. West Virginia as a 
Judicial Hellhole: Why Businesses Fear Litigating in State Courts. 111 W. VA. L. REV. 757 
(2008). 
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”the local population [has] a vested interest in the outcome of the case [a] 
presumption of bias should extend to the entire community.“182   Despite 
this concern, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Skilling’s conviction; its 
decision relied almost entirely on jurors’ reassurance, rendered under 
pressure from the trial judge, that they could be “fair and impartial.”183   
 With the findings of modern psychology, this practice seems 
medieval, and—with modern communications technology—completely 
unnecessary. 184  Because of the Sixth Amendment’s Vicinage Clause, which 
requires that (in federal criminal cases) juries be drawn from the state or 
federal district where the crime was committed, we acknowledge that using 
national jury pools for criminal cases may be more difficult than in civil 
cases. For such cases, however, federal criminal juries should at the very least 
become district or state-wide, because the Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure implementing the Vicinage Clause is much narrow than the Sixth 
Amendment requires.185  
 
 
182 Jordan Gross, If Skilling Can’t Get A Change Of Venue, Who Can? Salvaging 
Common Law Implied Bias Principles from the Wreckage of the Constitutional Pretrial 
Publicity Standard, 85 TEMPLE LAW REV. 575, 620 (2013). 
183 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 367-68 (2010). 
184 See Yokum, Robertson, & Palmer, supra note 118 (detailing the failure of self-
diagnosis).   
185 See Part III. 
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F. Vote-Aggregation without Deliberation 
 The book and movie 12 Angry Men popularized the notion that a 
minority of jurors, or even one heroic holdout, can save a jury from an unjust 
verdict. The reality is quite different. Jurors in the numerical minority at the 
beginning of deliberation are usually overridden by the end, due in no small 
part to peer pressure. As Harry Kalvin, Jr. and Hans Zeisel argue based on 
their collected data from actual juries and trial judges, the “deliberation 
process might be likened to what the developer does for an exposed film: it 
brings out the picture, but the outcome is pre-determined.”186 Indeed, far from 
empowering holdouts as in 12 Angry Men, the function of jury deliberations 
is to (eventually) enable the majority to outvote the minority, under the 
classic Condorcetian notion that they are probably wrong.187   
 The literature on group deliberation is revealing. In a now-classic 
1950s experiment, Solomon Ash demonstrated a “conformity” effect.188 A 
group of participants were tasked with publicly estimating which of three 
lines matched the length of a separate line. The task was repeated several 
times. Unbeknownst to one person—the actual subject—all other group-
members were hired staff, or “confederates.” These confederates publicly 
 
 
186 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 489 (1966). 
187 CONDORCET, supra note 107. 
188 Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One 
Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1, 3 (1956). 
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gave their answers—which were clearly incorrect—before the research 
participant was asked to answer. Three of four participants eventually began 
parroting the confederates.  
 Descriptively, social scientists have examined a range of predictors 
of post-deliberation verdicts. Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper conclude 
that, among  measures they studied, “the median [individual juror award pre-
deliberation] is the best single predictor of the jury’s final verdict.”189  
Consistent with Kalven and Zeisel’s findings from the 1960s, this more recent 
work suggests that jury deliberations do little more than consume time—
hours, days, and sometimes even weeks—while delaying an inevitable 
outcome that could have been gleaned by a simple mathematical aggregation 
of each juror’s individual vote. Indeed, courts might do well to do away with 
deliberation in favor of using the mathematical median of individual juror 
votes, as leading jury scholars routinely do with mock jurors.190   
 
 
189 Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict 
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513, 546 (1992); 
accord S. Femi Sonaike, The Influence of Jury Deliberation on Juror Perception of Trial, 
Credibility, and Damage Awards, 1978 BYU L. REV. 889, 902 (finding that the median was 
better than the mean). 
190 See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: 
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS 
DAMAGE AWARDS 197 (1995); Campbell, Chao, Robertson & Yokum, supra note 130, at 
557. But see David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1152-53 (2000) (finding higher punitive damages awards compared 
to the median of individual votes); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic 
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 72-75 (1998). 
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 To the extent that deliberating jurors do accomplish something other 
than settle on the median juror vote, as Condorcet theorized, it is unclear that 
that even vigorous deliberation enhances accuracy. There exists a rich social-
science literature on group deliberation, which can only be gestured towards 
here.191  Its implications are not promising. As Sunstein writes:   
If individual jurors are biased because of pretrial publicity that 
misleadingly implicates the defendant, or even because of the 
defendant’s unappealing physical appearance, juries are likely 
to amplify rather than correct those biases. Groups have been 
found to ...be more affected by the biasing effect of spurious 
arguments from lawyers; to be more susceptible to the “sunk 
cost fallacy”; and to be more subject to choice-rank preference 
reversals.192 
 
Simply putting people together for a discussion is, thus, no panacea for 
human cognitive failures. 
 To be fair, some research does find that deliberation is useful. For 
example, Jessica Salerno and Michael McCauley exposed fifty-five 
undergraduate mock-trial participants to testimony given by both low and 
 
 
191 See e.g., Michael C. Delli Carpini et al., Public Deliberation, Discursive 
Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 7 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 315, 324 (2004); Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does 
Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 12 (2006) 
(presenting experiments with “results which indicate that deliberation, even when attempted 
under ideal conditions, does not improve social welfare, and, in all but rare circumstances, 
may decrease it”). 
192 Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s 
Challenge to Habermas), 3 EPISTEME 192, 198 (2006). 
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high-quality experts. They found that the mock jurors were more discerning 
of quality after deliberating than before deliberating.193 
 One additional claim cited in favor of juries is the view that 
deliberation enhances jurors’ memories by opening space for fellow jurors to 
fill in gaps in their colleagues’ memories. We have already suggested that 
reliance on sheer memory should become obsolete, especially if we 
implement much shorter trial presentations and utilize rewindable video 
presentations. However, even there, scholars have found that the jurors who 
verbally dominate deliberations do not necessarily have the most accurate 
memories.194  In fact, those who change their recollections are not the least 
accurate ones, but the least confident ones.195 This parallels the Dunning-
Kruger effect, which generally proposes that confidence and knowledge are 
inversely correlated.196     
 As for why those with more accurate views tend not to lead 
deliberations, Lynn M. Sanders observes that “[w]hen Americans assemble 
 
 
193 Jessica Salerno & Michelle McCauley, Mock Jurors’ Judgments About Opposing 
Scientific Experts: Do Cross-examination, Deliberation, and Need for Cognition Matter?, 
27 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 37 (2009). 
194 MaryPritchard & Janice Keenan, Does Jury Deliberation Really Improve Jurors’ 
Memories?, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 589, 589 (2002). 
195 As Yeats once wrote, “[t]he best lack all conviction,” while “the worst are full of 
passionate intensity.”  Scott Simon, Opinion: Reading William Butler Yeats 100 Years Later, 
NPR, Nov. 28, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/11/28/939561949/opinion-reading-william-
butler-yeats-100-years-later.  
196 See Gordon Pennycook, et al., Dunning-Kruger Effects in Reasoning: Theoretical 
Implications of the Failure to Recognize Incompetence, 24 PYSCHONOMICS BULL. & REV. 
1774, 1774 (2017). 
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in juries, they do not leave behind the status, power, and privileges that they 
hold in the outside world.”197 Thus, deliberation can squelch the viewpoints 
of women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. Indeed, white men 
with college degrees are disproportionately chosen as forepersons,198  and 
when women speak, their words are perceived differently than identical 
words articulated by men.199 
 The fact that disparities in the willingness of some jurors to speak 
track disparities in societal goods heightens the importance of ensuring that 
juries are not only demographically representative, but also that their 
discussions are not monopolized by more privileged jurors.202  Of course, 
these issues would not be nearly so disconcerting to the Framers, who 
systematically excluded women and blacks from jury service in the first 
place.  
 Today, a mathematical aggregation of individual votes may in fact 
give diverse perspectives their proper weight. Alternatively, even live online 
juries might increase the representativeness of deliberation, as the lessened 
tension on Zoom relative to, say, a courtroom may empower some jurors.  
Associations that black Americans, especially, have with courtrooms—ones 
 
 
197 Lynn Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 364 (1997). 
198 VALERIE. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986). 
199 Jessica Salerno & Liana Peter-Hagene, One Angry Woman: Anger Expression 
Increases Influence for Men, but Decreases Influence for Women, During Group 
Deliberation, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 581, 581 (2015)  
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that might be less positive than those held by their white peers—might mean 
that black jurors will feel less anxiety about speaking during online 
deliberations than “real” deliberations.   
 An additional risk of deliberation involves the possibility that more 
outspoken jurors will utilize personal anecdotes and expertise (or, at least, 
assumed expertise). Both can be very influential during deliberation. For 
example, in research on mock jurors deliberating on a case involving lower-
back pain, individual jurors habitually cited purported knowledge, either 
personal or through acquaintances, of ideal clinical practice.200 Fellow jurors 
may also use rhetoric, repetition, and outright demagoguery that would not 
be permitted of a trial witness or attorney in closing arguments.  It is rather 
odd that the trial judge works so hard to ensure that jurors are not exposed to 
inadmissible material during the trial, but—between the jurors after trial—
anything goes!  
 Although one might counter that deliberation will cause jurors to 
mitigate biases and stereotypes. The literature is mixed. Deliberation may 
generally mitigate pre-existing stereotypes; however, if the stereotype is 
 
 
200 Megan S. Wright, Christopher T. Robertson & David Yokum, Mock Juror and Jury 
Assessments of Blinded Expert Witnesses, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: 
STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 195, 202-04 
(Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron Kesselheim eds., 2016). 
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activated during trial, deliberating magnifies its effects.201  Sunstein has 
highlighted a tendency of groups towards not compromise but polarization. 
Even when there is diversity of initial viewpoints, people usually focus on 
points of agreement—a tendency known as shared information bias.202 
Discussion, in turn, highlights agreed-upon positions, which reinforces 
confidence in those beliefs. Occasionally, the group’s position emerges as 
more extreme than that of any single individual.203 
 We here suggest that rather than deliberate as a group, jurors simply 
vote, which is a pragmatic solution, especially if juries become larger.  One 
downside of using mathematical aggregation rather than deliberation is that 
the latter may yield certain incidental benefits, such as increasing a sense of 
political efficacy and democratic engagement.204  On the other hand, scholars 
have concluded that “real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, 
can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials . . ., can make people 
feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many 
 
 
201 Tamara M. Haegerich, Jessica M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Are the Effects of 
Juvenile Offender Stereotypes Maximized or Minimized by Jury Deliberation?, 19 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 81, 81 (2013). 
202 Gwen M. Wittenbaum, The Bias Toward Discussing Shared Information: Why Are 
High-Status Group Members Immune?, 27 COMM. RES. 379, 393 (2000) (highlighting how 
decision-making groups “fail to disseminate effectively their unshared information”). 
203 Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 176 (2002). 
204 See generally Michael E. Morrell, Deliberation, Democratic Decision-making and 
Internal Political Efficacy, 27 POL. BEHAV. 49 (2005). 
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issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no 
deliberation had taken place.”205 
 If doing away with deliberation is held to be unconstitutional, a 
potential alternative would involve using parallel juries, where groups of, say, 
twelve jurors deliberate together and then the jury votes (rather than the juror 
votes) are aggregated to reach a verdict.206   Another possibility would 
involve having multiple juries decide different parts of a given case (e.g., 
liability and damages) concurrently.207   
III.  CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGAL REFORMS 
This Part reviews our proposed reforms’ constitutionality and 
legality.  Our assessment analyzes the Constitution’s commitment to public 
trials, the Sixth and Seventh Amendment jury-trial guarantees, and, for 
criminal cases, the Confrontation Clause.  
In approaching the constitutional questions, it is useful to recall that some 
Founders criticized traditionalists like Edmund Burke for preferencing 
practice to pragmatism and the past to the present.  Cass Sunstein highlights 
 
 
205 JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ 
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 191 (2002). 
206 See Campbell, Chao, Robertson & Yokum, supra note 130, at 557 (using such a 
method for research purposes). 
207 See Saks and Blanck, supra note 110 (discussing Cimino v. Raymark  Indus., 751 F. 
Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), which used two juries in a mass-tort context); Byron G. Stier, 
Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80 Temp. L. Rev. 1013 
(2007) (arguing for the use of multiple juries in individual cases).   
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Madison’s preference for “reflection and choice” over “accident and 
force.”208  Sunstein explains that they held that "current generations have 
more experience than past generations,” on which to draw.209  
To be sure, nothing in the Constitution explicitly forbids more jurors 
or, for that matter, any of our other advocated reforms.210  If the Framers 
wanted to prevent a jury of three hundred from convening, or if they wanted 
to explicitly require secretive deliberations, they could have done so. It is, 
therefore, useful to utilize a functional and purposive analysis that determines 
what goals the Founders sought to achieve with the jury institution, and, 
consequently, which reforms could help further these goals.211 As we wrote 
in the Introduction, those objectives include democratic engagement and the 
accurate sorting of truth from falsity.  The foregoing sections demonstrate 
how those purposes can be better achieved with contemporary science and 
technology.   
 
 
208 Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 398 (2006). 
209 Id. (cleaned up) (internal citations omitted). 
210 The Court has held that there is a minimum limit of six jurors in civil cases, see 
generally Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), but has not suggested a maximum limit.  
See generally Allen R.  Kamp, Constitutional Interpretation and Technological Change, 49 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 2019 (2014). 
211 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A constructivist coherence theory of constitutional 
interpretation. 100 HARVARD L. REV 1189, 1200 (1987) (describing an approach to 
constitutional interpretation analyzing the relevant “values, purposes, or political theory in 
light of which the Constitution or certain elements of its language and structure are  most 
intelligible.”). 
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After concluding that our reforms are constitutional, we analyze the 
permissibility of videoconferencing under the current Federal Rules of 
Criminal and Civil Procedure to examine the procedural implications 
necessary to actualize them.  
A. The Sixth and Seventh Amendments  
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury for most 
civil cases.  The substance of the amendment has never been incorporated, 
but most states comply with the jury trial requirement anyway.212  Although 
not applicable to all cases and waivable by the parties, the right “is preserved 
to the parties inviolate.”213  Similarly, the most fundamental rights that 
American criminal defendants are articulated in relation to the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.214 
Yet the Sixth and Seventh Amendments are, on their face, silent on 
all the proposals here presented.215  Although the Constitution, on its face, 
similarly lacks a unanimity requirement, in Ramos v. Louisiana, the Supreme 
Court recently held, due to racial-equity concerns, that jury verdicts in both 
 
 
212 See generally, Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh 
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1972). 
213 Justin Sarno & Jayme Long, Social Distancing & Right to Jury Trial Must be 
Reconciled, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1261476/social-
distancing-and-right-to-jury-trial-must-be-reconciled.  
214 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
215 See Ian Ayres, Pregnant with Embarrassments: An Incomplete Theory of the Seventh 
Amendment, 26 VAL. L REV. 385, 387 (1991) (arguing that a significant typo in an 
amendment indicates that the framers’ text is fallible). 
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state and federal criminal cases must be unanimous under the Sixth 
Amendment.216  Although one scholar argues that the Court’s reasoning 
would render most online criminal jury trials unconstitutional, this 
conclusion—as the author later acknowledges—seems contrary to answers 
offered by even the most conservative constitutional theory.217  This is 
because the inquiry into “whether jury trials must be in person ostensibly falls 
in what originalists [call] the ‘construction zone’—where legal practitioners 
are afforded greater (albeit not unlimited) latitude in adjusting constitutional 
rights,” but the Sixth Amendment is silent on unanimity.218 
The Supreme Court rarely finds the Constitution’s mere silence on a 
given issue to be dispositive, and has rejected that argument in several high-
profile cases, such as United States v. Nixon.219 And, in cases challenging the 
use of new technologies for alleged violations of the Constitution, originalists 
typically infer little to nothing from mere silence. They instead use what 
 
 
216 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1391 (2020) (a Louisiana jury had voted ten to 
two in favor of conviction.  Louisiana and Oregon, unlike other states, permitted convictions 
by nonunanimous juries.) 
217 Justin D. Rattey, Gap Filling: Assessing the Constitutionality of Virtual Criminal 
Trials in Light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 125 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 1, 3 (2020).  
218 Id. 
219 “The Special Prosecutor argues that there is no provision in the Constitution for a 
Presidential privilege as to the President’s communications corresponding to the privilege of 
Members of Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause. But the silence of the Constitution 
on this score is not dispositive.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 n. 16 (1974) 
(emphasis added).  
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resembles a functionalist220 approach to discern what sorts of technological 
use or misuse are unconstitutional.221  
 The Sixth and Seventh Amendment’s relative silence on how juries 
should be structured suggests that the constitutionality of some of our more 
profound reforms—for example, asynchronous video trials or aggregating 
votes—largely turns on whether the proposed procedures serve the jury’s 
intended purpose.  As the Supreme Court has said, “[t]his purpose is [in large 
part] attained by the participation of the community in determinations of guilt 
and by the application of the common sense of laymen who, as jurors, 
consider the case.”222  The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause will 
likely be the biggest point of contention if our reforms are adopted. 
In 2001, Justice Scalia in Kyllo v. United States concluded that the 
police’s use of thermal-imaging technology to peek through a home’s is was 
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, even though its use does not require 
that police physically enter a home.223  Thus, like any other governmental 
intrusion into a home, the majority found that using such technology is 
 
 
220 See infra note 216.  
221 As early as 1925, the Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be 
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was 
adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and 
rights of individual citizens.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)) (emphasis added).  
222 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 US 223, 229 (1978). 
223 Id. at 39-40.  
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presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant.224 Tellingly, Justice Scalia 
conceded that the majority’s originalist or textualist approach, compared to 
“[t]he dissent’s proposed standard—whether the technology offers the 
‘functional equivalent of actual presence in the area being searched,’ would 
seem quite similar to our own,” at least “at first blush.”225  
In 2018, Justice Gorsuch—another originalist—issued a dissent in 
Carpenter v. United States, which like Kyllo concluded that police use of a 
new technology (here, enabling mass acquisition of cell-site records) was a 
“search.”226 Despite dissenting, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion resembled a 
concurrence; he agreed with the majority’s conclusion that law-enforcement 
needs a warrant to obtain cell-phone data, but disagreed with its functional 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.227  Although ostensibly analyzing 
constitutionality by focusing on the Fourth Amendment’s “original 
meaning,” his textualist analysis was essentially functionalist, turning on his 
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment “grants you the right to invoke its 
guarantees whenever one of your protected things (your person, your house, 
your papers, or your effects) is unreasonably searched or seized.”228 
 
 
224 Id. at 40.  
225 Id. at 39; see also supra, note 213.  
226 See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); see also Bernard 
Chao, Ian Farrell, Catherine Durso, and Christopher T Robertson, Why Courts Fail to Protect 
Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology (February 23, 2017). 106 CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW 263 (2018). 
227 Id. at 2261 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
228 Id. at 2264.  
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Together, Carpenter and Kyllo suggest that tradition has little place in 
constitutional interpretation where the Constitution is silent.  
Since courts in other contexts apply balancing tests—for example, 
weighing whether “good cause” for video depositions exists during pre-trial 
discovery229—some scholars, in the first weeks of the pandemic, guessed that 
a similar approach would be used for online jury trials.230  Their predictions 
were accurate.231 Of course, online jury trials may be constitutionally 
necessary during exigencies like pandemics if a defendant’s right to an 
impartial trial is to be respected.232 As discussed in Part I, they may also be 
necessary in cases where criminal defendants’ speedy-trial rights are at 
risk.233 Moving our analysis beyond the pandemic context requires a more 
nuanced analysis, but the caselaw provides some guidance.       
With that framework in mind, we analyze the effect of our reforms on 
the ideal of public trials, then analyze the constitutionality of our reforms 
 
 
229 See 1 JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. GLEISNER, III, EDISCOVERY & DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE § 18:13 (2020). 
230 Michael Shammas & Michael Pressman, The Permissibility & Constitutionality of 
Jury Trial by Videoconference, JURY MATTERS, (Civil Jury Project, New York, N.Y.), May 
2020, https://myemail.constantcontact.com/May-Newsletter-of-the-Civil-Jury-
Project.html?soid=1127815376566&aid=CVq1WlqBpgU.  
231 See Boutros, et al, supra note 45, at 53. 
232 See Wilson, supra note  Surveys show that seventy-five percent of jurors are at least 
a little nervous about jury duty, and that people of color, Democrats, and older Americans 
are even more nervous than the general population. Such findings suggest that pandemic-era 
juries will be less representative of the community in ways that could negatively affect 
defendants. See Wilson, supra note 93. 
233 Boutros, et al., supra note 46, at 50. 
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under the Constitution’s requirements involving impartiality, confrontation, 
and vicinage.  
B. Public Justice 
American justice is public justice.234  As the Supreme Court has 
written, public criminal trials are “essential” since “the presence of interested 
spectators … keep [a defendant’s] triers keenly alive to a sense of their 
responsibility and to the importance of their functions.”235  Courts have since 
clarified that civil trials should generally be just as public as criminal ones.  
The California Supreme Court’s rationale is representative: “[T]he public has 
an interest, in all civil cases, in observing and assessing the performance of 
its judicial system.”236   
Public trials are also valuable for a less obvious reason. Like an 
Athenian agora, a courtroom is more than a public space. It is also a school, 
one where the general public assumes the role of “students” auditing free 
“lectures” about law and politics, and where jurors become not only students 
but also temporary policymakers. Less melodramatically, jury service 
provides an opportunity to cooperatively evaluate crucial societal issues, and 
 
 
234 See Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and 
Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RES. 1, 1 (2011).  
235 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 
(1948)). 
236 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 1178, 1210 (1999) 
(emphasis added). 
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to do so in a manner that is increasingly less common in our age where so 
much debate occurs in partisan news or social-media bubbles. John Stuart 
Mill mirrored this point in Considerations on Representative Government, 
where he cited the jury’s ability to prepare citizens to live in a democracy by 
teaching them to evaluate and therefore respect norms.237  
The well-documented decline in the percentage of trials may render 
the right to a public trial even more important today than in Mill’s time. 238  
On this front, there is little conflict between online justice and public justice 
and increasing use of the former may help actualize the latter. In addition to 
streaming public hearings on their websites, several states during the 
coronavirus pandemic decided to make hearings available for citizens who 
lack internet access by setting up viewing rooms in courthouses with spaced 
seating.239  After coronavirus ends, public libraries, local and state 
legislatures, and other communal buildings could continue coordinating with 
courts to ensure that every citizen, whether jurors or spectators, can watch 
online trials.  Oddly, some courts—especially before the coronavirus—
 
 
237 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 78-79 
(Prometheus Books 1991) (1861).  
238 See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2177 (2014).  
239 See, e.g., Jamiles Lartey, The Judge Will See You on Zoom, But the Public is Mostly 
Left Out, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/13/the-judge-will-see-you-on-zoom-but-the-
public-is-mostly-left-out. 
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resisted video broadcast of trials and hearings, as if that would be too public, 
while permitting audio broadcasts.240 
Especially if courts post our proposed asynchronous trial videos 
online, the internet will vastly increase the numbers of people able to watch 
trials. As noted earlier, we have witnessed the potential of live online hearing 
during the coronavirus pandemic, including in April 2020,241 when about 
2,000 viewers watched a one-day Zoom bench trial.242  It is likely that making 
video a more permanent feature of our justice system, especially in criminal 
cases, will increase the number of jury trials conducted by (1) reducing the 
number of plea deals (through disincentivizing prosecutorial overreach) and 
(2) making jury trials substantially less expensive, and (thus) reducing 
parties’ incentives to settle.  Finally, it is not clear that, in the civil context, 
other alternatives to physical, live jury trials—mandatory arbitration, for 
example—harm democracy less than online trials.   
C. The Confrontation Clause 
The Confrontation Clause provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
 
 
240 See Mary Flood, Windows Opening and Doors Closing-How the Internet is Changing 
Courtrooms and Media Coverage of Criminal Trials, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 429 (2008). 
241 Siegal, supra note 62. 
242 Id.  
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against him.”243  Some scholars have written that the Confrontation Clause 
would prevent criminal trials, bench or jury, from being held entirely online 
unless a defendant consents. But the exact meaning of “confrontation” 
remains an open question. In addition, even if confrontation does require 
defendants to be in the same room as their accusers, it is difficult to see why 
it would also require jurors be present.   
We have yet to receive a firm answer from the Supreme Court on 
whether online trials violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, 
but given the rate of technological advance it seems likely the Court will 
eventually uphold the practice, at least in live trials conducted with secure 
videoconferencing software.244 Several cases address rights provided by the 
Confrontation Clause.245  A subcategory of such cases—involving witness 
testimony against the accused via closed-circuit television—are useful in 
discerning how courts would treat confrontation issues in online, 
 
 
243 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.  
244 See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 35, at 37 (“In 2013, I predicted that judges and lawyers 
would initially resist the idea of remote video hearings but would nevertheless relent because 
of the impressive nature of high-definition video displays. I also predicted that the Supreme 
Court would find the Constitution's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause satisfied by 
remote witness appearances, but maybe not within my lifetime.”) (emphasis added).  
245 See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (“The Court has assumed 
that [the defendant] has a due process right . . . to be present at any stage of the criminal 
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of 
the procedure.”); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (“One of the most basic of the 
rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the 
courtroom at every stage of his trial.”). 
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synchronous criminal jury trials conducted via Zoom or another 
videoconferencing platform.246  
In Maryland v. Craig, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause 
does not categorically forbid child-abuse victims from testifying against 
defendants via one-way closed-circuit television.247  In deciding the key 
issue—whether the physical presence of the defendant before his accuser was 
necessary—Justice O’Connor wrote that “the Confrontation Clause does not 
prohibit [the] use of a procedure that, despite the absence of face-to-face 
confrontation, ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to 
rigorous adversarial testing and thereby preserves the essence of effective 
confrontation.” 248   When a sufficient state interest justifies virtual instead of 
physical confrontation, the Court implied that three conditions must be met 
to make one-way testimony constitutionally permissible. First, witnesses 
must testify under oath; second, they must be subject to “full cross-
examination”; and third, they must be visible to “the judge, jury, and 
defendant” when testifying.249  If one-way video using pre-1990s technology 
can be constitutional given a sufficient state interest, then two-way video 
 
 
246 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990).  
247 Id.  
248 Id.  
249 Id. (“Because there is no dispute that the child witnesses in this case testified under 
oath, were subject to full cross-examination, and were able to be observed by the judge, jury, 
and defendant as they testified, we conclude that, to the extent a proper finding of necessity 
has been made, the admission of such testimony would be consonant with the Confrontation 
Clause.”) (emphasis added).  
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using today’s technology may well meet constitutional muster.250  For this 
reason, several scholars have recently rallied around the idea of using two-
way video to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.251  
State analogues to the federal Confrontation Clause vary.  Some 
state’s constitutions categorically bar the use of videoconferencing in 
criminal jury trials. Massachusetts, for example, requires “face to face” 
confrontation.252  But others allow digital testimony.253  For example, in 
People v. Wrotten, the New York Court of Appeals ruled in 2009 that—
absent a statutory proscription—trial courts are free to order two-way video 
testimony when circumstances (here, an ill witness) require it.254  It cited 
several state and federal cases to render its decision.255  More importantly, 
the court used logic that could apply even absent exigent circumstances, 
writing that, “live two-way video may preserve the essential safeguards of 
 
 
250 See United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir.1999) (not applying the Craig 
standard because the trial court’s use of two-way video “preserved the face-to-face 
confrontation”). 
251 See Will Resnik, Get with the Times: Why the Use of Live Two-Way Video Testimony 
Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause., 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 461 (2018); Hadley Perry, 
Virtually Face-to-Face: The Confrontation Clause and the Use of Two-Way Video Testimony 
13 ROGER WILLIAMS UL REV. 565 (2008); Benjamin Aguiñaga, Confronting Confrontation 
in a FaceTime Generation: A Substantial Public Policy Standard to Determine the 
Constitutionality of Two-Way Live Video Testimony in Criminal Trials, 75 LA. L. REV. 175 
(2014). 
252 Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371 (1988); see also People v. 
Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill. 2d 360, 365 (1994) (interpreting the Illinois Constitution’s confrontation 
clause).  
253 See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 315 P.3d 136, 152 (2012) (citing Craig and holding that 
neither the Colorado nor federal constitution render CCTV testimony unconstitutional). 
254 People v. Wrotten, 14 N.Y.3d 33, 40, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (2009).  
255 Id. at 39-40 (citing cases). 
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testimonial reliability, and so satisfy the Confrontation Clause’s primary 
concern with ‘ensur[ing] the reliability of the evidence against a criminal 
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary 
proceeding before the trier of fact.’”256 
Some of our suggestions that could provide the most benefit to 
defendants, such as increasing the number of jurors and thereby improving 
accuracy, will almost certainly require that the logic in cases like Wrotten be 
expanded to allow for videoconferencing even absent exigent circumstances. 
Given the choice, innocent defendants confronted with the research 
suggesting that larger groups make more accurate decisions may rationally 
choose an online jury, even if it means viewing witnesses and jurors by video.   
D. The Implications for Procedural Rules 
If our reforms in Part II are adopted, key goals of both criminal and 
civil juries might be strengthened, especially those articulated in the first 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure—to promote the “just, speedy, and efficient” 
resolution of trials257 —and the second Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure—
“to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure 
 
 
256 Id. at 39 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
257 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate 
unjustifiable expense and delay.”258   
During the Covid-19 pandemic, several states quickly acted to allow 
grand juries to deliberate virtually and to permit arraignments by video. But 
lawyers and judges soon complained about a lack of guidance from 
policymakers.  Even if jury trials remain physical as a general matter, it would 
be irresponsible not to even discuss the procedural implications of online 
trials—especially given the probability of another pandemic. Below, we 
briefly analyze how, if online jury trials are to become a reality, state and 
federal procedures might need to change. We use the Federal Rules of 
Procedure as jumping-off points.   
The changes that would need to be made to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure are not insignificant. For instance, Fed. R. Crim. P. 1—
detailing definitions and scope—would need to include more thorough 
definitions for “video,” “videoconference,” “place of prosecution and trial,” 
and ubiquitous words like “before”; when a later rule stipulates that a 
defendant must appear “before” a magistrate judge, for example, the Rules 
should clarify if “before” requires a physical presence.   
 
 
258 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2. 
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Since before coronavirus the rules allowed for video evidence in 
limited (generally pre-trial) circumstances, a second useful change could 
involve adapting existing provisions to jury trials. For example, Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 5(f), concerning initial appearances, stipulates that “video teleconferencing 
may be used to conduct an appearance … if the defendant consents.”259  Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 10 likewise allows for videoconferencing during arraignments if 
consent is given.260   
Interestingly, the 2002 Committee Notes permitting 
videoconferencing noted that “[t]he Committee was satisfied that the 
technology has progressed to the point that video teleconferencing can 
address the concerns raised in the past about the ability of the court and the 
defendant to see each other and for the defendant and counsel to be in contact 
with each other, either at the same location or by a secure remote 
connection.”261  This supports the notion that online trials can satisfy not only 
the Confrontation Clause, but also the right to effective counsel, so long as 
reliability concerns articulated in cases like Craig are addressed. A third, less 
explicit change would involve updating the 2002 Committee Notes to reflect 
modern technology.   
 
 
259 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(F).  
260 FED. R. CRIM P. 10(c). 
261 Id.  
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 Fourth, Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 should be updated to ensure that, in 
implementing our reforms, it continues to accord with the Sixth 
Amendment’s Vicinage Clause.262 Under the current rule, “[u]nless a statute 
or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute [the] offense” 
in the location where the crime was committed and in a timely manner.263 
This rule, however, is ostensibly narrower than what the Sixth Amendment 
actually requires.  The Committee should reconsider its current language 
considering evidence tying more jurors to increased accuracy and 
impartiality, as well as problems of bias reflected in controversial local trials 
like the Enron case.264 Because the Vicinage Clause is satisfied if the jury is 
from “the State and district wherein the crime was committed,”265 Fed. 18 
should be expanded to allow potential jurors to be drawn from entire districts. 
Importantly, at least three circuits266 have held the Clause does not apply to 
the states,  
A fifth change might involve creating an entirely new rule detailing 
how online jury trials should be conducted, not unlike the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure’s stipulations regarding best-practices for out-of-court 
 
 
262 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime [was] committed.” U.S. 
Const. Amend. VI (emphasis added). 
263 FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.  
264 See Part II.  
265 Supra note 263.  
266 See, e.g., Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1988); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 
593 (5th Cir. 1986); Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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witness testimony, discussed below. The rule’s drafters might benefit from 
examining several of the coronavirus-era protocols mentioned earlier.267 
  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state analogues would not 
require changes as far-reaching as those required for criminal-procedure 
rules. Most would involve merely modifying definitions. That said, one key 
change that policymakers should consider would involve implementing—in 
whatever new rule is created to allow for online jury trials—the 
considerations already detailed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a),268 such as the 
requirement of “appropriate safeguards” for video testimony.269  
 Interestingly, Rule 43(a) has been used as a threshold in criminal 
trials. In United States v. Guild, the court decided that “because of the 
importance of live testimony in a criminal trial and the fact that the 
Confrontation Clause is not implicated by this testimony,” Rule 43(a) should 
serve as a threshold.270 Although not directly relevant to scenarios where 
jurors (as opposed to witnesses) participate via videoconference, the issue—
involving concerns like economic and temporal efficiency, pragmatism, and 
the ease of credibility determinations—overlaps with factors relevant to jury 
 
 
267 See supra note 99.  
268 FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (describing when testimony need not be taken in “open court” 
and can instead be taken by video).  
269 Id.   
270 United States v. Guild, 2008 WL 191184, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
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trials as well.  For example, “the relative cost of transporting” witnesses to 
court, as well as the ability of the court to “subpoena witnesses”—both 
factors in Rule 43(a)—could in analogous fashion be used to suggest best 
practices for online juries, especially in evaluating courts’ abilities to 
empanel a representative jury.271   
 Rule 43(a) exemplifies the experience judges already have with 
videoconferencing in civil matters. Because state rules already mirror 43(a)—
for example, Maine’s, which like 43(a) usually requires that testimony be in 
“open court” but allows “contemporaneous transmission from a different 
location” upon a demonstration of “good cause”272—state policymakers 
could also use Rule 43(a) a guide.273  
 Ultimately, notwithstanding the need to reconsider procedural rules, 
adopting our reforms should generally lessen complexity.  For example, 
several of the most debated procedural rules that our proposals implicate—
 
 
271 See DANIEL DEVOE & SARITA FRATTAROLI, VIDEOCONFERENCING IN THE 
COURTROOM: BENEFITS, CONCERNS, AND HOW TO MOVE FORWARD 8-9 (2009), 
http://socialaw.com/docs/default-source/judge-william-g.-young/judging-in-the-american-
legal-system/04devoe-sarita-paper.pdf. Though it focuses on courts ability to use their 
subpoena power over proposed witnesses, in the context of an online jury trial, a similar 
test—the ability of the court to bring jurors to court—seems pertinent. Id.  
272 ME. R. CIV. P. 43 (emphasis added).  
273 See Guild, 2008 WL 191184, at *3 (“Recognizing both the importance of live 
testimony in a criminal trial and the fact that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated by 
this testimony, the Court will use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) as the threshold 
showing for the use of videoconferencing.”). 
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venue rules, for instance274—may become less convoluted, because our 
national jury pool reform reduces forum-shopping incentives.   
CONCLUSION 
 The Founders would not recognize how we build bridges, treat 
cancers, and transport ourselves.  Yet the modern jury trial would be oddly 
familiar.  The stagnation would disappoint them. As James Madison 
remarked: “Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst 
[Americans] have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and 
other nations, [they have] not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for 
custom, or for names, to overrule … experience?”275 
 We have suggested that, if invented today—after the peculiar 
experience of coronavirus and with 232 years of scientific, political, and 
social experience—the jury trial would look quite different.  Since the 
institution is supposed to accomplish its essential functions of facilitating 
democratic deliberation and efficiently resolving issues of public importance, 
it should look quite different.276 Under a new social contract, we might 
convene fifty or more jurors; utilize condensed videos to integrating 
evidence, argument, and jury instructions; and even allow jurors to render 
 
 
274 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391. 
275 THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)). 
276 See supra, Part I. 
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individual, mathematically aggregated decisions privately, in a time and 
place of their choosing.  Alternatively, we might opt for more moderate 
reforms—conducting more online jury trials to enable larger jury pools or 
aggregating the decisions of several parallel juries instead of several 
individual jurors, thereby preserving deliberation while retaining the benefits 
of aggregation.  
 Together, these features may greatly increase the purposes of 
accuracy and efficiency.  Although some reforms seem radical, this is only 
because of how radically static the institution has remained despite scientific 
and social developments since 1789.  Our reforms are no more radical than 
overused alternatives to physical jury trials like mandatory arbitration, and 
are probably more constitutional. Online jury trials are surely less offensive 
to the Seventh Amendment than the increasing use of contracts of adhesion 
that incorporate a combination of class-action waivers and arbitration 
agreements to effectively nullify the right to a civil jury trial.277   
 Ultimately, our reforms enhance the jury trial’s ability to achieve its 
essential goals: Giving the people—not elites—the ability278 to accurately 
decide cases and determine societal norms.     
 
 
277 See, e.g., Sevier, --F.3d--, 2021 WL at *4-7 (listing cases). Nonetheless, unless a 
change-of-terms provision’s scope is unreasonably exceeded, courts rarely find that 
unilateral arbitration agreements are unconscionable, especially after AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
278 See Blackstone, supra note 8.  
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